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ABSTRACT

This study seeks to examine and refine the concept of consociational democracy, a political system in which political leaders of
socially and politically distinct groups interact with one another in.
an atmosphere of moderation and mutual accommodation.
A discussion of the explanations, suggested by various political
theorists, of the political behavior and relationships in a consociational democracy produced a list of the basic characteristics of the
system. Characteristics which were either ambiguous or ascribable to
other political systems were eliminated.
The Benelux countries— Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg—
are three countries which have moderate political systems similar to
the general definition of a consociational democracy. TJsing the Bene
lux countries as test cases made it possible to refine further those
characteristics isolated in the theoretical discussion, and to synthe
size a model of the political activity of a consociational democracy.
This model, in turn, provided the basis for a theory as to why elites
of distinct social groups are able to interact in s. moderate, mutually
accommodative fashion.
The results of this study suggest, in broad terms, that consocia
tional democracy exists because most individuals within the system see
this type of interaction to be the normal and proper approach to poli
tics. In actual political practice, relations between different
groups or leaders are based upon mutual recognition of legitimacy.
Distinct social groups and their political leaders recognize the right
of other social groups to participate in the political system, and the
individual groups recognise the right of their political leaders to
act as spokesmen for the group and to interact freely with the leaders
of other groups. Finally, there is-the common recognition that the
political system, represented by the sovereign authority of the State,
is the legitimate forum for political activity.
As an afterword, there is a brief discussion as to the possible
impact of the domestic practice of consociational politics on a coun
t r y ^ approach to foreign affairs.
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In the study of comparative politics* many authors have sought
to produce theories explaining why different political systems behave
in different ways.

One pattern of political behavior that is now under

scrutiny is called consociational democracy. ^

Consociational democracy

is a tezm which is applied to countries which are divided into distinct
social blocs, and which, at the same time, exercise a moderate style of
political activity through the adoption, by the elites, of certain tech
niques of conflict management or conflict avoidance.
Various authors have sought to define the essential nature of this
arrangement, to explain where it comes from and how it works.

So far,

several theories have been produced, some of which agree with one an
other while others do not.

The purpose of this thesis then is to exa

mine the various theories of consociational democracy and to synthesize
a coherent theory of consociational politics from them.
Before explaining how this is to be done, let us examine the ori
gin of the term 1consociational democracy.1 Democracy refers, of
course, to a political system where the government is subject to popu
lar control.

Consociation can be thought of as being a cross between

association and confederation.

An association is a group of individuals

formally organized for the pursuit of a specific common purpose or
specific common purposes, but members are not required to surrender
their individuality to the group.

Similarly, a confederation is a group
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of provinces or countries (pre-existing political entities) which have
banded together to form a single political entity for certain purposes,
but which retain a strong measure of autonomy.

Consociation refers to

the relationship between a set of distinct religious or social groups
which, for various purposes have come to act as a single unit even
though retaining some measure of their- individuality.

Consociational

democracy then is consociational behavior in the political system.
The first step in examining this pattern of political activity
is to discuss the various theories of consociational democracy in terms
of their relative merits.

Then, to test the results of our discussion,

we must examine the theory in the context of several political systems.
In this regard, the Benelux countries, Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Luxembourg, are the most suitable for our purposes.
The Benelux countries possess certain qualities which make them
useful as objects of study.

First, all three countries have extensive

histories of representative government as well as traditions of modera
tion in their political system.

The practice of moderate politics

means that the countries already fulfill one of the broad definitions
of consociational democracies.

Extensive histories of representative

government give us a larger amount of political data than would be
available in a country whose regime was only thirty or forty years old.
All three countries are in the same general geographic area and
share traditions of Western culture, general though these traditions
may be.

Comparing the Netherlands and India, on the other hand, would

be more difficult because cultural differences would be far more appar
ent; the Dutch are a Western society while the Indians have strong
traditions of caste and religion influencing their behavior.

By

examining countries with common Western traditions, we eliminate a
number of variables which could otherwise cause considerable confusion,
Belgium and the Netherlands are about the same size while Luxem
bourg is considerably smaller.

Size is not, in ana of itself, impor

tant except that larger countries, such as France, Germany, Italy,
Great Britain, and the United States, have been more often studied
and, indeed, form the foundation for many of the existing models of
socio-political behavior.
The Swiss, the Austrians, the Scandinavians, and the tiny coun
tries like Liechtenstein are all potential subjects for further study,
and, indeed, the first two of these countries have undergone consider
able scrutiny in previous examinations of consociational politics.

The

Benelux countries, however, present a special case in that they are at
present working together in close harmony as an international unit, the
Benelux Economic Union.

While the Scandinavian countries have formed

the Nordic Council, their efforts have been more limited than the Bene
lux countries.

What is the reason for this cooperation between the

countries of Benelux?

If the countries are indeed consociational, it

may be that this has an impact on their international behavior.

We

shall speculate on this possibility when the examination of the coun
tries in terms of consociational democratic theory is complete.
The study of consociational democracy will proceed in four
stages:
(1) a discussion of the major theories of consociational democ
racy;
(2) an examination of the governments and historical development
of the Benelux countries;

(3) an analysis of the circumstances in the individual countries
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in terms of the theoretical information supplied in Chapter
One 5
(!*) the construction of a theory explaining the nature of con
sociational behavior, and a model describing the special
qualities of political interaction associated with consocia
tional democracy.
In addition, our study will allow us to speculate about the implications
of consociational democracy on both national and international politics.

Before beginning this discussion of consociational theory, there
are several terms which recur in this thesis which need to be defined:
Elite - here meaning the political elite, is a collection of individuals
who are involved in the formulation of policy or who seek to in
fluence the policy-making process for the benefit of a group for
which they are spokesmen.
Social bloc, social group, bloc, group - used interchangeably, these
terms refer to any collection of individuals who share a common
bond of language, religion, ideology, or culture, and who see
themselves as distinct from other groups.
N.B. Although these units are distinct, this does not imply that
they are static. Members of one group may elect to join another
group. The important quality is that, on the whole, the members
recognize commonality within a group which is different from
other groups.
Cleavage - a fundamental division in society created by adherence of
individuals to differing attitudes, religions, etc.
Segmented society - a society which has cleavages.
Over-lapping or cross-cutting cleavage - a characteristic or attitude
shared by individuals which cuts across cleavages, e.g., Catholi
cism would be an over-lapping cleavage in the case of French
workers and French middle class.
Reinforcing cleavage - a cleavage which accents existing cleavages,
e.g., Catholicism reinforces the ethnic cleavage between the
largely strong Catholic Flemings and the largely secular Walloons.
Political system - the activities of, and relationships between, leaders
and any other individuals who exert an influence on governmental
policy and the way it is determined, e.g., political parties,
voters, judges, etc. Also, rules of order.
Pattern - a recurring relationship between elements in a political
system.

Model - a collection of patterns which is used to describe the aggre
gate activity in a political system by relating various facets
of activity.
Theory - an explanation of the circumstances which cause and maintain
the interrelated patterns of a model.

7
NOTES— INTRODUCTION

^Gerhard Lehmbruch, "Consociational Democracy in the International
System," European Journal of Political Research 3 (1975)s378. See also
Hans Daalder, "On Building Consociational Nations: the'Cases of the
Netherlands and Switzerland," International Social Science Journal 23,
3 (1971):355.

CHAPTER
'THEORIES

OP

I

CONSOCIATIONAL

DEMOCRACY

Consociational democracy is a relationship between political
elites and social groups.

Various authors have used different approaches

to assemble theories of how a consociational democracy works and why.
This chapter will discuss, first, why consociational politics demands
a model separate from other major models, and then will examine differ
ent theories of consociational democracy, comparing their respective
merits or demerits.
,Gabriel Almond envisioned two possible models of society in a
country With a representative democratic political system.

The Anglo-

American model represents a relatively homogenous society characterized
by many over-lapping social groups (cross-cutting or over-lapping cleav
ages).

The other, the fragmented model of Italy, for example, is

characterized by predominantly non-over-lapping groups (reinforcing
cleavages).^

Almond draws these models from what is known as the plural

istic system, which is based upon three assumptions;
(1) Society contains groups with discernible differences of race,
religion, or language. At the same time, these groups are
technically equal in the eyes of the law. A Catholic banker
receives the same treatment as a Jewish farmer.
(2 ) Ehe different groups are small in that no one group has a
clear majority.
(3) There are certain cross-cutting affiliations. For example,
regardless of the nature of a country, all citizens are citi
zens. These common bonds are sufficient to allow all indivi
duals to be classed as members of a single unit, a state for
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example. At the same time, there are differences which show
the country to he made up of several different sub-units,
yielding some non-over-lapping affiliations, which is to say,
reinforcing cleavages.^
Half Dahrendorf proposed that social conflicts occur more often
within societies with a predominance of reinforcing cleavages.

Socie

ties with overlapping cleavages predominating, on the other hand, tend
to have fewer conflicts because individuals moderate their opinions to
fit the various positions of the several groups to which they adhere.^
The United States, which has mostly over-lapping cleavages, is charac
terized by a moderate, relatively calm political scene.

There is a

slow rate of political turn-over, few politicians being ousted after
one term or less, and non-campaign activity tends toward moderation
and compromise.

In Italy, on the other hand, where cleavages are

strong and reinforcing, competition is more severe.

The possibility

of compromise to achieve goals is small.However, there is a flaw in the approach of Almond and Dahrendorf.
The two authors, who associate moderation with over-lapping cleavages
and competition with reinforcing cleavages, do not take into account
conditions in the Netherlands or Switzerland.

In those countries,

moderate political activity, which they identify with the over-lapping
model, occurs within societies with strong, reinforcing cleavages.
Various authors, such as William Mitchell, Sidney Verba, and
David Truman, have sought to modify the original model to include these
countries.^- Their general conclusion was that moderate politics did
not rely exclusively on social structure, but arose also from tradi
tions.

One source of these traditions is ’habit background', that is,

the political system was moderate because the citizens were accustomed
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to moderation.

Traditions of moderation could also arise from 'rules

of the game', the way people approach politics.
Almond explains how the over-lapping model works:

an individual

who is making political choices is subject to ambiguous influences from
over-lapping attitudes of the many groups to which he adheres.

On the

other hand, a Swiss, in a segmented society, makes political decisions
based largely on the influence of habit background or rules of the game,
as his political attitudes arise from the homogeneous ideas of his par
ticular group.

What is the nature and source of these influences?

How.

can we differentiate between moderate countries of Almond’s model and
those countries which present both a moderate political atmosphere and
reinforcing cleavages?

Consociational democracy, as described earlier,

displays this combination of moderation and reinforcing cleavages.

An

examination of consociational theories should enable us to determine,
at least in part, the answers to these questions.
There are several different theories and understandings about how
a consociational democracy works and how it comes into being.

Some of

these theories focus exclusively on the interaction among the elites
of distinct social groups.

Others include the -interrelationship be

tween the elites and the social blocs, i.e., between elites, between
elites and blocs, and between blocs.

A third group focuses on the pro

cess of cultural growth of the whole society, examining the political
culture and attitudes of the elites and masses rather than technical
qualities of moderate interaction, such as relying on formal rules of
order to restrict large-scale dissent in parliamentary debates.
Two writers who deal exclusively with the nature of elite inter
action axe Robert Putnam and Gerhard Lehmbruch.

Putnam, who uses the
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term "coalescence” to describe the consociational mode of elite, inter-,
action, suggests that this coalescence is the result of elites mutually
attempting to halt the spread of fragmentation in their political sys
tem.

If the effort is successful, the system can be maintained.

elite efforts should break down, the system would break down.
suggests that

If

Putnam

. . the behavior of American political elites in the

years before the Civil War may be interpreted as an attempt to create
conditions of elite coalescence.

The last major social institution to
g
crack along regional lines was the party system."
The problem with Putnam's argument is that the system he is
examining, in this case the U.S.A., had many over-lapping cleavages.
The combatants could not be differentiated exclusively by regional ori
gin.

Northerners fought for the South, Southerners for the North, and

large numbers of individuals remained neutral.

Hence, Putnam's idea

of fragmentation control is not based upon control of friction between
discrete units of society.

Another problem with Putnam is that his

intention is to explain consociational politics as being an aberration
in normal elite interaction rather than as a different system.

To Put

nam, coalescence is a type of conflict management rather than a normal
way elites go about their business.
Another author who focuses on elites is Gerhard Lehmbruch.

Lehm

bruch, when describing elites.of consociational countries, argues that
the social groups are distinct and are held together through compromise
and mutual accommodation on the part of the elites.

He suggests that

elites are mutually accommodating because the attitudes of the existing
elite structure support such action, and, as new elite members enter
the system, they are socialized into the attitudes.

Lehmbruch suggests
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five influences which craate the attitude pattern:
(1) Some basic national symbols are accepted by all the elites
of the system;
(2) Pa st violence is seen as having had traumatic effects,' i.e.,
violence is not seen as a profitable means of problem-solving;
(3) There has been a tradition of representative government; that
is, the elites representing the different groups have tradi
tionally had an opportunity to discuss their views;
(]+) There exists intense informal communication among the elites
which is not open to non-elites;

(5) Given the number of groups involved and their relative size,
majorities can be formed only by bargaining.7
Lehmbruch's list of influences, although they describe conditions
which probably exist in a consociational country, does not show whether
or not it describes a pattern of elite behavior unique to a consocia
tional system.

In addition, we need to know more about the ability of

the elites to maintain their own legitimacy in the eyes of the masses,
and about the ability of those same elites to deal with new elite mem
bers who are not so completely inculcated into the values of the tradi
tion.
A proper description of elites should reflect their ability to
deal with changing circumstances and attitudes, especially in view of
the conflicts associated with distinct social groups.

Changes in cir

cumstances and disaffection with on-going policies can cause further
fragmentation (creation of fringe groups) and lead to the appearance
of extremist leaders who owe no allegiance to the system.
If questions of on-going elite legitimacy and non-cooperative
leaders were only lesser concerns, and the system operates under influ
ences which approached Lehmbruch's ideal, can his list be considered a
description of only a consociational state?

Under Almond's model, the
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United States is a country with over-lapping social cleavages and a
moderate political system.

Comparing qualities of the United States

to qualities of Lehmbruch's model, it is immediately obvious that at
least four out of five influences are, indeed, characteristic of the
United States,too.

Although leaders disagree as to methods and pro

grams, they all claim to seek the well-being of the whole country; hence,
they share some basic symbols.

Past violence, such as the Civil War or

labor riots, are seen as traumatic and generally unprofitable.

Ameri

can traditions of representative government predate the creation of the
country by centuries.

The fourth influence, informal channels of com

munication, are found in traditions of informal button-holing and smokefilled rooms which abound in the United States.
The fifth influence, that majorities can be formed by bargaining
only, is found in Germany and Great Britain, two countries which have
political parties based on cross-cutting affiliations.

Although it does

not occur all of the time, we find circumstances where no party was able
to gain an absolute majority and the most successful party was obliged
to seek to form a coalition with one or more parties.
Lehmbruchfs list of influences, then, can be said to be common to
moderate political systems, but.it cannot be said to be the exclusive
domain of consociational democracy.
The elite analyses by Lehmbruch and Putnam are inadequate as
descriptions of consociational systems, although Lehmbruch's does give
some possible clues as to the source of consociational activity.

The

two authors do, however, show, by the nature of the flaws in their argu
ments, the need for establishing the relationship between the elites and
the social groups as a mainstay of a consociational theory, i.e., the

flaws show a need for additional information.

Without such a relation

ship being shown, a study which showed Lehmbruch's qualities could be
about any moderate polity.
One author who examined this relationship was James Dunn.
work, "Consociational Democracy and Language Conflict:

In his

A Comparison of

the Belgian and Swiss Experiences," Dunn suggests that a particular
ethos had been established such that the elites behave in an accommoda
tive fashion in a consociational country because the society as a whole
o
had come to expect it of them.
Arend Lijphart also approached this question of the relationship
between elites and society.

Lijphart's image of consociational elites

places them in the context of their country.

He argues that the conso

ciational system will succeed to the degree "(l) . . . that the elites
have the ability to accommodate the divergent interests and demands of
the sub-cultures . .

(2) .

. . that they have the ability to trans

cend cleavages and to join incommon efforts with the elites of rival
sub-cultures; (3) • • . (that they have) a commitment to the maintenance
of the system and to the improvement of its cohesion and stability; and
(U) . . . that the elites understand the perils of political fragmenta
tion.
These elite characteristics were generated by a fragmented
society.

Lijphart, in a discussion on the crisis in Northern Ireland,

tried to explain why consociational politics does not work in that situa
tion.

Important Northern Irish leaders, both Protestant and Catholic,

do not display the characteristics we have summarized.

The Eeverend Mr.

Paisley, for example, sees the perils of fragmentation as being less
important than the protection of Ulster Protestant values and forms.

He makes no attempt to transcend cleavages, nor does he seek to accom
modate divergent interests.

The cumulative result of elite activity in

Northern Ireland is that stability is, at best, a cease-fire rather
•than a lasting peace.

Although Paisley does not typify all Northern

Irish leaders, he is in a sufficiently strong position to negate the
efforts of more moderate leaders.
It can be said that the presence of the first two characteris
tics in Lijphart*s list indicate the presence of the second two.

Will

ingness to bind the interests of various groups together, rather than
seeking to dominate, indicates that elites define the system as more
than the will of their individual group.

As such, the elites will tend

to seek to fulfill the first two characteristics.

Hence, only the first

two need be considered in detail.
Lijphart, in addition to the above elite characteristics, suggests
six socio-political characteristics which he felt typified consocia
tional countries, some of which fit Northern Ireland, while others did
not.

As Lijphart*s concern in this article was Northern Ireland, the

model is rather sketchy, seeking only to prove its applicability or in
applicability in that setting.
The first two socio-political characteristics that Lijphart sug
gests are the presence of a multiple balance of power,^ and the pre
sence of distinct social cleavages.^

Drawing upon the experience of

the Dutch, Lijphart suggests that three or more distinct sub-cultures,
no one of them able to fonn a majority alone, are necessary to prevent
the domination of a minority by a majority.

Such domination could occur

in a bi-cultural state like Northern Ireland, with consequent political
instability.

The problem with the multiple balance of power concept is

16
that it is not numbers of groups, but rather biases and attitudes vjhich
maintain peace or generate hostility between groups.

Three groups in

a five-group setting, for example, could band together against the
other two.

Likewise, in a bi-cultural setting, peace is maintained be

cause moderates seeking co-existence are predominant, or extremists,
seeking absolute division, create disorder, drive the moderates and
their attitudes into hiding.
Lijphart next argues that if there were several distinct social
groups, a grand coalition might be acceptable to the various parties.

12

In simpler terms this means that, if necessary, it would be possible tc
unite.the elites of all of the major groups into a single government.
This does not mean that grand coalitions, which occur only in excep
tional ^circumstances, must appear regularly, but rather that the crea
tion of such a body is not Impossible and is facilitated by the exis
tence of a number of major groups.
Fourthly, Lijphart suggests a need for some degree of national
13
solidarity. J

Many Catholics in Northern Ireland identify with their

Catholic compatriots in the Republic rather than with Ulster Protes
tants.

Protestants often treat the Catholics as conquered subjects,

at worst.

As a result, the Northern Irish have few common bonds of

shared experience or tradition.

Owing fealty to the same monarch, a

symbol which joins the Flemings and Walloons of Belgium, has no effect
in Ireland.

The Belgian king is a Belgian rather than a Fleming or

Walloon, but to the Irish Catholics, who have their own traditions
(many kingdoms, destroyed centuries ago), the Anglo-Scots, Ulster Pro
testants and their Queen are little more than foreign oppressors.
The fifth characteristic that Lijphart suggests is a small

1 j,
population. * In this regard, he sees two interdependent qualities.

(1) In a society where groups are very distinct, the population
must he small lest the intense, elite interaction demanded
in managing many distinct groups becomes impossible to carry
out.
(2) The elite membership will deal with primarily domestic rather
than foreign affairs.^5
Lijphart1s ideas here come from the notion held by others, such as
Lehmbruch, that consociational countries tend to be neutral in the
field of foreign affairs.

He offers as an explanation of that neutral- .

ity that there are not enough leaders to act decisively domestically
and abroad and that strong cleavages are politically relevant only in
smaller countries. ^

The quality of leaders is, however, not really a

function of size of polity.

Athens in the fifth Century B.C., for

example, had a population of 100- 200,000, and even fewer citizens; yet
it produced many great leaders and thinkers.

Furthermore, the politi

cal relevance of social cleavages also has nothing to do with size.
Unrest among Hispanics of Blacks over civil rights in the United States
is as much a product of exacerbated social cleavages as a language^
group confrontation in a small country.

Smallness is not significant,

then, in and of itself.
Lijphart!s sixth point is that social cleavages must be distinct.
It is important to understand that a segmented society must be more
than purely an array of social groups which are different or which per
ceive inequities.

Unlike social groups in the United States, they must

be discrete, with each group having its own political elite and there
being relatively little intemingling with other groups.
The final socio-cultural characteristic that is mentioned is that
the external threats to a state can impress upon the leaders the need

18
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for intergroup cooperation. ' Lijphart adds that the threat must be
recognized by all of the rival- sub-cultures as a common threat.

Catho

lics in Northern Ireland, for example, might not view Irish Republican
intervention as a threat, but rather as liberation.
In the discussion of the six socio-cultural characteristics, the
notion that politically distinct social groups exist is most important.
A multiple balance of power among distinct groups, although conceivably
present in a consociational system as a conflict-restraining influence,
is not a guarantor of mutual restraint.

Mutual restraint, as a norm,

is found in the acceptability of a grand coalition as a normative model.
This characteristic can, in turn, be expressed in the broader terms of
Li jphart's elite characteristics, since the power to form a grand coali
tion demands the elites have the support of their own sub-culture and
are recognized by other sub-cultures as a legitimate political voice.
The actual presence of a grand coalition is merely the pinnacle of a
broader political consensus.
Of the remaining three influences, two, small population and ex
terior threats, while possibly having an impact, are not reliable
guarantors of peaceful interaction.

The former was shown to be irrele

vant, while the latter’s validity depends on the relationship betwTeen
the threat and the social group, i.e., it must be a threat to all par
ties in order to encourage joint action.
Finally, there is "some measure of national solidarity," a very
important value as it reflects the ability of elites to convince masses
that common action is more than a passing phenomenon.

Indeed, it

represents the unity needed against external threats.

Hence, Lijphart’s

ideas of social cleavages, elite interaction with society, and national
solidarity are significant socio-cultural characteristics.

Lijphart's descriptions of elites and-socio-cultural characteris
tics gives us an idea of how a consociational country is able to func
tion.

Why are the masses willing to live in a system like this rather

than demanding a government which deals exclusively with their problems
and is divorced from all other social blocs?/ This question becomes
especially important when there is trouble between social groups.

As

was mentioned earlier, James Bunn suggests that society has been cultured to expect cooperative behavior on the part of elites.
this process of culturing come about?
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How does

Another way of looking at this

question is how does a consociational democracy come into being?

The

answer will indicate whether a consociational system could be produced
in any country with distinct cleavages, or whether it is a system which
apose because special circumstances had existed at one time.
Two views concerning the culturing process are those of Hans
Daalder and Yal Lorwin.

Lorwin suggests that consociational practices

arise from a tradition of localism, i.e., social groups in a consocia19
tional country were once geographically distinct. '

In his discussion

on this concept, he suggests that these distinct groups experienced
gradually increasing political interaction in areas of mutual interest.
At the same time, however, the bulk of political power remained in the
hands of the local sub-groups long after a single political unit was
formed.

The relationship was confederal.

ferred to the central regime
demanded of the sub-groups.

More power began to be trans

as more and more joint decisions were
This process led, eventually, to the crea-

tion of a consociational state out of a confederal body.
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Lorwin also

notes that in spite of this transfer, there remains strong identification with the old localisms.

21
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Hans Daalder agrees, by and large, with lorwin*s position of
growing interaction between distinct groups.

In his treatment, how

ever, he puts more emphasis on the involvement and importance of elites
in the transition.
In Daalder's words, "Consociationalism is . . • not a response
to the perils of subcultural splits, but the prior reason why the subcultural divisions never did become perilous."
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Instead of elite

accommodation being the force that restrains political division, ". . .
earlier consociational practices facilitated the peaceful transition
towards newer forms of pluralist political organization. . ."

23

Daalder and Lijphart differ in their analysis of elites.

Lij-

phart is similar to Putnam in that the focus of his study is on the
present, a present where elite interaction is forced into certain pat
terns by the problems of fragmentation.

For Daalder, on the other hand,

both the patterns of elite interaction and the array of politicized
social groups reflect the way in which both elites and masses feel the
political system should be organized.

Daalder presents an image of

consociational democracy that suggests that the elite practice of mutual
forbearance and accommodation is a product of a long process and is
infused in the political culture of the nation.
pattern be reproduced elsewhere?

Can a consociational

Daadler says yes, it can be.

Elite

culture, he argues, should not be viewed as a process which only re
flects objective cleavages, but rather as an independent variable,
leaders, in short, should be viewed as people who lead, not merely
people who temporarily counteract other political forces.

They should

be* seen as the elites of states with the capacity to influence develop
ments, especially over the long run.

By using the available repre
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sentative traditions and cultures, Daalder feels that stability "between
distinct groups could be achieved without destroying cultural inte
grity and without resorting to violence for nation-building.^
Lorwin* s and Daalder's descriptions of the culturing process
present possible images of how conflict was1avoided during developmen
tal stages.

Still, we need to know which argument is stronger.

If

Lorwin is correct, then certain physical relationships between the
groups are necessary; particularly, they should begin contact while
separated by distance.

There should be no economic or social need for

a person to move from one region into the other, i.e., no group is
being driven by a desire to expand, by an outside threat, or by econo
mic scarcity to move into its neighbor’s territory.

Daalder's view,

on the other hand, depends less on physical relationships between
groups and more on who is in charge.

A strong, active elite can effect

changes in attitudes and circumstances if they have an opportunity to
stop trouble before it gets out of hand.
tradicts the other; yet each is different.

Neither writer totally con
To determine which argument

is most useful, or if both or neither are useful, we must compare their
descriptions with actual circumstances.
As was mentioned earlier, it is known that the Benelux countries
exhibit qualities which may be deemed consociational.
then, will proceed in two stages:

This study,

an introduction to the government

and history of each of the three countries, and an examination of the
socio-political systems.

The first stage will present a summary of

how each country's government operates and how each country developed.
This summary will, in turn, give us some insight into whether Lorwin's
or Daalder's ideas are most useful.
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The second stage, the examination of the socio-political system
of the three, will he based on Lijphart1s list of characteristics.
This analysis will allow us to make any additions that are necessary
and to further refine the ideas that we have of how a consociational
democracy works and how it is different from other systems.
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CHAPTER
THE

BENELUX

COUNTRIES:

II

GOVERNMENirS

AND

HISTORIES

One facet of political interaction that was not discussed in the
previous chapter was the distribution and interrelationship of author
ity among1 the different branches of government.

The reason for this is

that, although the basic patterns of government in various countries
may be similar, many interrelationships will be influenced by attitudes
or circumstances which are unique to the individual countries.

It

v^ould be extremely difficult to draw meaningful generalizations con
cerning those aspects of a political system which yield consociationality because some functions which are technically the same are different
in practice.

It is in this context that we will examine the govern

ments and the socio-political development of the Benelux countries,
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.

This discussion will provide

a background for the examination of elites and socio-political charac
teristics in the next chapter.

In addition, the examination of socio

political development should allow us to resolve the questions raised
by Daalderfs and Lorwinfs proposals on the culturing process.
All three of the Benelux countries are constitutional monarchies.
They each have a monarch, a Cabinet, a legislature, and free and open
elections.

It is at this point that similarities begin to break down.

Thje three monarchs arose from different circumstances and, perforce,
have different characteristics.

The Dutch monarchy, for example, has
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lost most of its power over the last century and a-half.

Today, its

powers have become severely limited and virtually no real power is exer
cised by the monarch.

However , the powers of the Grand Dukes of Luxem

bourg are far broader than those of the Dutch monarch, as they still in
clude a wide array of royal prerogatives.

The Grand Duke, if circum

stances demanded it, could control or dissolve the legislature and rule
by decree.**'

Even without the presence of a crisis, the Grand Duke

exerts considerable influence as he hand picks his ministers and
2
appoints the members of the Council of State (described below).
When the Kingdom of Belgium was established, the monarchy and its
function were sharply defined.

Most European monarchs remained distinct

from their legislature and, gradually, the royal authority passed from
King to Parliament until the monarch reigned while the legislatures
ruled.

For Belgium, however, the monarchy was defined as being an

integral part of the legislative system of checks and balances.

3

The

King acts as overseer to the legislature and can, in the event of a
crisis, act decisively to break legislative dead-locks.

The advantage

enjoyed by the King here is that while other monarchs have surrendered
their power to the legislature, the Belgian King is legally bound to
be ready to act if circumstances demand and to remain involved as a
non-partisan force in the legislative process.

k

An important quality of all three Benelux monarchies is the per
son in the position.

While, legally, there are potentially powerful

monarchs in Luxembourg and Belgium and a limited monarch in the Nether
lands, in actual practice the strength of the office of monarch lies
in the holder of the title.

If an individual is actively involved in

policy-making, the monarch is strong, whether he has constitutional

powers or not.

If he is content to allow his Cabinets to decide policy

and deal with crises, then regardless of constitutional authority, he
is outside of the mainstream of political activity and serves a primar
ily ceremonial function.
The legislatures of the three countries also differ one from the
other.

In each of the three countries, the lower house (Netherlands—

Second Chamber, Belgium— House of Representatives, Luxembourg— Chamber
of Deputies) is elected by popular suffrage.

All three countries use

proportional representation, i.e., seats in the house are distributed
to the parties according to the percentage of votes each party won in
the election.

(Phis is a common practice in most European countries.

The upper house of the Netherlands, the First Chamber, is elected
by the Provincial Councils in the same way that legislatures of German
Lender still send and pre-1900 American States once sent representatives
(Senators) to one house of the national legislature.

The Belgians, on

the other hand, choose their upper house through a combination of royal
appointments and elections from the lower house (the selections are in
different proportions).

Luxembourg's upper house, the Council of State,

has no real legislative power and is little more than a collection of
advisors to the Duke and Chamber of Deputies who are appointed by the
Duke.
While the Dutch upper and lower houses are both involved in legis
lation, the Belgian and Luxembourger upper houses are left, by and large,
out of the legislative process.

They can suggest legislation or changes

in existing legislation, but their actual purpose is to oversee events
and, if necessary, adjudicate questions of constitutionality.
The real power in most democratic states in Europe is found in
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the Cabinet, or Government as it is sometimes known.

For the Dutch, a

Cabinet minister is expected to make decisions on policies which do not
demand legislative action on his own initiative, or after consultation
with other ministers.
ters.

Dutch ministers can be, at times, their own mas

In Belgium, on the other hand, all policy is subject to Parlia

mentary debate.

To institute or change policy, a minister must first

justify it before the Parliament.

Luxembourg lies somewhere in the

, middle as policy is subject to the review of the Council of State which
would, in turn, bring any questions to the Chamber of Deputies.
A final quality which can be used to describe all three countries
is that all three have a constitution which is based upon rules of order,
guidelines for interaction, rather than being a description of ’correct
thinking' , which ties the political system to the maintenance of parti
cular socio-political relationships, what in Article 1+5 of the Irish
Constitution are known as "Directive Principles of Social Policy.”

Al

though it is only a framework for cooperation, consociationalism must
also depend upon the willingness of the actors to deal with one another
in an atmosphere of mutual trust.
In summary, we can describe the three countries according to the
relationships between the monarch, the legislature, and the Cabinet.
The Dutch have a system where the Cabinet holds most of the effective
power while the legislature acts as a check on their power.
has only a minor role.

The monarch

In the Belgium government, on the other hand,

the most important feature is the Parliament with the Cabinet working
closely with the legislators themselves.
and is also bound to the legislature.

The King is an important actor

Finally, Luxembourg’s government

has a strong Cabinet with a strong system or review and recall.

The

monarch has great potential influence and can counter-balance either
the Cabinet or the Chamber of Deputies.
*

*

*

One fact that is apparent from the discussion on the governments
of the Benelux countries is that, although they border upon one another,
each country has undergone different influences.
describe and analyze these influences.

The task now is to

This examination will focus

upon the circumstances surrounding national intergration such as out
side influences and their impact, the relationship between groups, and
political changes, such as the movement toward universal suffrage and
its effects.
The Netherlands
24

The Netherlands declared its independence from Spain in 1^71.

At the time, the country was more a loose confederation of provinces
than a united state.

The national government consisted of a council

of representatives from the Provincial Councils.

While the day-to-day

mechanics of local government were carried out by the Provincial Coun
cils, the representatives to the national government met in what Daalder
describes as M. . . something more akin to a series of negotiations be
tween independent states than to a national legislature."^

There was,

however, a strong recognition ofa community of interest such that all
parties recognized themselves aspart of the Republic of the Nether7
lands.
The people in the original set of provinces were all Calvinists,
a fact which undoubtedly enhanced their ability to work together.

There

were, however, local differences and traditions which could make indi
viduals suspicious of the motives of their neighbors.

There were also
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distinctions in dialects which ranged from minor local idioms in most
provinces to a'completely different dialect in Groningen.
During the 1620’s, the religions situation was complicated when
the Netherlands annexed parts of Brabant and Limburg, two Catholic
provinces which were part of the Spanish Netherlands, or what we now
know as Belgium and Luxembourg.

This had little affect upon general

Dutch policy because the country as a whole was heavily involved in ex
pansion of trade, colonization, and wars with Spain, Prance, and Eng
land which occurred intermittently until the mid-1700’s.

In time, how

ever, Catholics would become a significant political force.
Prom about 1792 until l8lJ+, the Netherlands fell under the con
trol of Prance.

Although French liberalism, a mixture of democratic

ideals and anti-clericalism, had an influence, the Netherlands remained
a semi-independent state, first as the Batavian Republic and then as a
kingdom under one of Napoleon's brothers.

The administration and inter

nal policy remained in Dutch hands.
In l8ll+, at the time of the fall of the First French Empire,
William of Orange, head of one of the most important families in the
Netherlands, was proclaimed King of the United Netherlands.

One of his

first acts was to persuade the Congress of Vienna to allow him to ad
minister the provinces of the Spanish (Austrian as of 1713) Netherlands.
These provinces made up what was to become, in I83O, Belgium and Luxem
bourg.

Although the Congress did give these to William, Belgium even

tually revolted in I83O and Luxembourg was granted independence in I867.
During William’s reign, the arrangement of Parliament (the StatesGeneral, as it is known) was altered at the suggestion of the King's
o
Belgian subjects so that it became bi-cameral.
Instead of being purely

a body of Provincial representatives, a council of notables was added
as a second (upper) chamber.

In 182|8, the States-General was altered

again, in response to the local unrest arising from political disturb
ances sweeping all of Europe.

The chamber of Provincial representatives

became the First Chamber, replacing the Council of notables.

A new

Second Chamber was henceforth to be elected by direct popular vote.

9

During the period I8llj.-l8l4.8j, large changes began occurring with
in the political structure of the Netherlands.
arose from the ashes of French influence.^

A liberal movement

To counteract this move

ment, the Calvinists began organizing into the Anti-Revolutionary Party
(ARP) and were,dedicated to retention of older, more traditional values.
Oyer time, an upper-class, less fundamentalist faction of the ARP broke
free and formed the Christian Historical Union.

After I8I4.8 , the

Socialist and Catholic Parties also gained strength.

The establishment

of universal suffrage in 1919 established these five groups as the con
trolling forces in Dutch politics.

Today each group, by government

fiat, has its own newspaper, is entitled to specific times on television,
and is a discrete unit within Dutch society.
In the Netherlands today, sociologists describe this pattern of
discrete units as verzuiling, or pillarization. ^

The continued viabil

ity of verzuiling is in doubt today because of the number of splinter
parties which appeared during the I960*s.

The splinters appear, how

ever, to be losing ground back to the older Big Five parties and the
system is returning to the status quo ante.

I will attempt to document

this in the next chapter.
In terms of the culturing processes suggested by Lorwin and Daal
der, circumstances in the Netherlands support both arguments.

The
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government of the provinces remained largely a local concern for over
two hundred years, while national politics per se were handled as a
•community of interest.

When interest groups became ideological or

religious, rather than provincial, the elites were already accustomed
to mutual accommodation.

Hence, Lorwin's idea that local bodies gradu

ally grew together is supported.
At the same time, Daalder's suggestion that a desire for coopera
tion predated unification is also necessary as it helps explain, first,
how the Dutch provinces were able to get together in the first place
and, second, it explains how the system was able to survive the transi
tion from regionally oriented attitudes to religious and ideological
ones.

Lorwin's idea is bound to the maintenance of localism as the

foxmdation of elite cooperation.

Daalder, by focusing on the result

of culturing, allows for the decline of such regional bias in the con
tinuing maintenance of the political system as well as change in circum
stances.
Belgium
Belgium came into existence in 1789 when there was a momentarily
successful revolt against Austria, which had gained the territories
from Spain in 1713*

Prior to 1789 > Belgium was a set of discrete pro

vinces, only a few of which had enjoyed short periods of independence or
semi-independence.

There was no history of either ethnic or political

unity among any of the provinces.

12

The revolt in 1789 had been brewing

for only a few years, arising from the effects of the French revolution,
which were spreading across Europe.

The parties involved were Walloons,

a French-speaking group from the southeastern half of the territory,
and Flemings, who came from Flanders in the north and west and who spoke
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a dialect of Dutch.

The revolt lasted only a short time before a new

army arrived from Austria and retook control.
In 1792, France annexed the territory outright, giving the area
French courts and a French administration.

The Walloons soon embraced

French liberal ideas and actively supported the French.

Among the Flem

ings, the nobility, clergy,.and peasantry found themselves being con
trolled by the middle classes who had also embraced the fashionable
French language and French ideas.

Until l8ll|, Belgium was run complete-

ly by French-speakers (Francophones) from both Wallonia and Flanders.

13

When William I of the new Kingdom of the United Netherlands took
control of Belgium and Luxembourg in 181I+, he began instituting reforms
whereby the Flemings would be administered in Flemish while the Walloons
would be administered in French.

In spite of this, and indeed many

other conciliatory gestures by the King, there remained distrust and
friction between the Calvinist Dutch and the Francophone Walloons and
Flemings.

The conservative Catholic Flemish-speakers, influenced by the

Catholic clergy, trusted neither group.^
In I83O, a revolt began in Brussels, which soon spread throughout
Belgium.

A liberal constitution was written, establishing Belgium as

a monarchy with a strong legislature.
pold of Saxe-Coburg to be the new King.

The Belgium leaders invited Leo
His acceptance gave the coun

try a monarch who was neither Flemish nor French, but rather would be
Belgian.

In addition, since Leopold was uncle to Victoria, then British

heir apparent, Belgium gained strong support from the pre-eminent power
in Europe.

Although the war with the Netherlands dragged on until 1839 >

Belgium was assured of an independent existence.
The unity of the l830's gave way to the factionalism of the lSi+O's.
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Exponents ,of anti-clerical French liberalism began forming- a strong
political movement, especially among the Francophone middle-class.
This movement was opposed by a strong, traditional, pro-Catholic body
which was led by the old nobility and the clergy.

In addition, in 181;6,

a vocal body of Flemings began protesting the decline of Flemish culture
caused by the disdain in which the Francophone elite held all things
Flemish.

A study committee appointed by King Leopold examined Flemish

grievances and Francophone counter claims that Flemish was only the
language of the uneducated.

The committee concluded that the Flemings

were correct in their contentions, so Leopold began a program of annual
competitions to encourage Flemish art and literature.
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The four-way split of Catholic-secular and Flemish-French was
limited in its scope during the l800’s because only a small part of the
population was enfranchised.

The Catholic Party, which had begun mak

ing significant gains during the latter half of the century because of
troubles brewing within the Liberal Party, worked, nevertheless, for
the enhancement of Flemish rights.

During the 1880’s, for example, the

Catholics passed laws making it mandatory that the courts and administration would use Flemish with those who spoke it.
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With the coming of the twentieth century, a French-inspired
Socialist movement began making significant political gains in the in
dustrial regions of Wallonia.

Even before the establishment of univer

sal suffrage^ a small offshoot of the Liberal Party was calling itself
the Socialist Party.

The two movements, the Walloon industrial workers

(Socialists) and the Flemish peasants needed only the change to univer
sal suffrage and the concurrent increase in potential voting support
to blossom forth as significant parties.

World War I was a time of great internal turmoil “because, while
some Flemings embraced the Germans as liberators, others fought in
trenches under officers who spoke a different language.

King Albert

rewarded the loyal Flemish over Walloon protests by granting universal
suffrage.

The language conflict was now fully under way.
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Since 1920, most political activity has centered on making adjust
ments to ease tensions between religious and secular groups, and between
the language groups.

Between 1920 and 1932, Flemish rights and privi

leges were gradually improved until finally, a language boundary was
established such that the country was divided into two language regions,
Flanders and Wallonia.
language.

Each region was to be administered in its own

The laws of the 1880's had dealt only with specific cases,

i.e., only if a person could not speak French was any consideration
made.

The 1932 law provided that all of Flanders would automatically

be administered in Flemish.
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Brussels, the capital, was to be bilingual.

During the early 1950fs, a new problem arose where there was a
question whether King Leopold III had behaved properly during the fall
of Belgium in 191*0.
5k% of the people.

A referendum showed that the King was supported by
A breakdown of the vote showed that the Flemings

supported by over 60%, while the Walloons and Bruxellcises (Frenchspeaking citizens of Brussels) supported the King by only 1+6 and 1+8%.
Rather than risk a crisis, Leopold abdicated in favor of his son
Baudouin.19
A second major dispute of the 1950’s fell along religious-secular
lines.

A question over the relationship between the parochial and state

schools was resolved in a great compromise called the Pact Scholaire
which guaranteed equal standing to both groups.

During the late 1950's and the 1960's', protest rallies took place
over the legal position of language groups.

The growth of Yolksunie,

the Flemish language party, caused a concurrent growth of a Walloon
counteiTpart, the Walloon Rally.

This growth caused the Constitutional

Amendment of 1970, only the third amendment ever to the Belgian consti
tution.

This amendment created cultural councils for each region to

act as advisors to the government on the problems of the individual
regions.
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Problems over the creation and implementation of this

amendment have caused the downfall of several governments.

The possi

bility of a resolution of the problems is very real, however.

Further

discussion of this situation will be presented in the next chapter.
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In Belgium, the forces of division, especially during the last

sixty years, have been titanic.

The ability of the elites to hold the

country together and to at least limit the violence is remarkable.
Similar circumstances have led to bloodshed and revolt elsewhere.
What knowledge does the case of Belgium give us with regards to
the question of culturing?

Lorwin!s localism gains obvious support

from Belgium as it describes the mechanics of both creation and main
tenance.

The provinces of Belgium had been administered individually

for some time yet had been under a common overlord, whether Spanish,
Austrian, French, or Dutch.

French influences had undermined the dis

creteness of the divisions as there was now an overlap in the worst
possible place; the entrepreneurs and administrators in Flanders, though of
Flemish stock, had become "foreigners" by adopting the French values and
language.

The control of much of the political sphere by these Franco

phones between I83O and 1932 led to considerable unrest among the nonFrancophone Flemings who felt that the normal channels for airing

grievances or for seeking justice had been Closed to them.

The rein

forcement of localism through the 1932 language boundary and the 1970
Amendment will probably reestablish a viable balance without dividing
the country into two separate countries, as it establishes an atmosphere
of Flemings solving Flemish problems and French solving French problems.
Daalder's thesis also holds because recognition of the rights of
Flemings and a willingness to find a common solution demands the founda
tion of commonality of interest and desire.

Belgians, both Flemings

and Walloons, had been willing to work together in 1789 and were pre
pared to do so again in I83O.

If this had not been the case, Belgium

would not have survived.
*

An important aspect of the culturing process, which is involved

in both Lorwin's merging localities approach and Daalder's approach of
pre-existent accommodative elite attitudes and which emerges from the
discussion, is the recognition by each social group of the legitimacy
of the other social units*than themselves.

The political system is

malleable and can be altered to fit changes in circumstances or changes
in. the prevailing mood of the people.

The political events in Belgium

over the last sixty years bear this out as the elites have sought to
absorb Flemish and Walloon language parties and create circumstances
which would remove the threats perceived by the two groups.
Luxembourg
Luxembourg presents a different set of circumstances to us than
did its Benelux partners.

Unlike the other two countries, Luxembourg

has been a unified state for over one thousand years.

The only time

that it has not had its own administration was briefly during the
fourteenth century and during the French occupations of 1792-l8li|.

Founded in 9&3

Count Sigfrid, Luxembourg was ruled by the same

dynasty for several hundred years.

A part of the Holy Roman Eknpire, it

produced several Bnperors, one of whom greatly expanded the territory
(it was reduced to one-third of its size in 1839) and raised it to the
status of a Duchy.

In li+lj.2, the dynasty died out and the Duchy passed

into the hands of the last Duke’s cousin, the Duke of Burgundy.

Control

passed shortly thereafter to the House of Hapsburg, in-law3 to the Bur
gundians.

Luxembourg was to have famous Hapsburgs such as Charles V,

the Holy Roman Snperor and King of Spain, as its Dukes.
During one of the endemic wars with France, Luxembourgers success
fully resisted a French invasion.

Pleased with his subjects, Charles

arranged that a provincial council of notables should run the country
in his absence.

This arrangement continued for over two hundred years

when, as with most of Europe, Luxembourg was invaded by revolutionary
France.^
As with Belgium, Luxembourg was incorporated as a department or
administrative district of France.

Although there was a French-style

liberal movement already extant in Luxembourg, even the liberals opposed
the annexation.

Sporadic fighting occurred for about ten years, cul

minating in a large-scale revolt.

Peace was restored by Uapoleon Bona

parte, by then Emperor, who returned most of the control of local
administration to the Luxembourgers.

2?
■

French occupation had several influences on Luxembourg, most im
portant of which is that it reinforced the sense of Luxembourger
nationalism which had lain untested for some time.

Catholics and secu

lar liberals, who had been drifting apart, were drawn together against
a common foe.

At the same time, French administration caused the ideas
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of representative democracy and anti-clericalism to become more firmly
entrenched.

j

In l8li|, as previously mentioned, William I of the Netherlands
annexed Luxembourg.

This annexation was different from that of Belgium

in that the Congress of Vienna made Luxembourg a Grand Duchy and Wil
liam was its Grand Duke.

The term Grand Duchy means that the ruler of

the country was an autonomous sovereign, recognizing no higher author
ity.

Hence, William was sovereign of two separate countries, the

Netherlands and Luxembourg.

So, in spite of sharing a common monarch

and administration, Luxembourg was more than a province of the Nether
lands.

In practical terms this distinction is probably unimportant,

but it does give a psychological flavor of continuity to Luxembourg’s
traditions of discreteness and semi-autonomy.
In 1839 > at the conclusion of the Datch-Belgian conflict, Luxem
bourg was partitioned with Belgium annexing over two-thirds of its
territory.

The remaining territory remained under Dutch rule.

During

the 181*0’s, Lexembourg was granted a Belgian-style constitution, a
measure which included direct election of deputies to a legislature
which had for centuries been a council of appointed notables, together
with representatives selected by cantonal and professional organiza
tions.

Although this constitution was restricted somewhat during the

late I85O's, parliamentary activity was in full swing by the time Luxem-

2k
bourg became independent in I867.

Luxembourg became independent be

cause the title of Grand Duke had passed to the family of Orange-Nassau,
the junior line of the Dutch royal house.

No real change had taken

place in Luxembourg except that its tie with the Dutch had been severed.
Luxembourg's government decided at the end of World War I that

1+0

the country needed an economic linkage with another country to enhance
its own industrial capacity.

Such a linkage was formed with Belgium in

1921 when the two formed BLEU, the Be Igium-Luxembourg Economic Union.
Not only did this linkage put industrialization into high gear, it also
restructured Luxembourger society.

Luxembourg1s factory workers, in

1921, were predominantly Socialist and nominally Catholic.

A substan

tial part of the country1s electorate was still agricultural.

Between

1921 and the present, that arrangement changed substantially.

The

farmers moved to the city, bringing their more traditional attitudes.
Government efforts to diversify the nation's industries from J0% steel
into other areas led to the reordering of society through growth in
international banking and other services, rather than industrial work.
»t

25

The changes taking place in Luxembourg led to the exacerbation of

existing social divisions.

Richard Rose and Derek Urwin examined poli

tical development in various countries, among them Luxembourg.

Their

study focused upon the processes through which the lower classes, both
workers and peasants, were brought into political organizations.

Rose

and Urwin found that the conflict between secularism and religion led
to a segmentation of voluntary associations and the press.

26

As workers

and peasants found themselves becoming more politically involved, be
cause of changes in the patterns of national political activity and
organization, they were encouraged to join in voluntary politicallyoriented associations such as peasants' leagues and labor organizations.
Many of the lower classes were unwilling to join except within a tradi
tional framework.
this framework.

The Christian party leaders and prelates provided

27

This study by Rose and Urwin is a propos to our study on Luxembourg

1+1
in that it points to the existence of a relevant and discrete social
cleavage along religious-ideological lines.

A cursory examination of

changes in trade union memberships further supports this contention.
In 191+7» most industrial workers were members of socialist trade unions
like the politically active Confederation Generale du Travaille du
Luxembourg (C.G.T.), which had appeared during the pan-European social
ist movement of the late 1800's.

The C.G.T., like similar unions in

Prance and Italy, favored social reform, pacifism, and the dissolution
of national boundaries.

28

At the time, the C.G.T. and a few smaller

socialist unions could draw only 2,300 members in toto.
non-union workers was marginal.

The number of

29

Today, the trade unions form a markedly different array.

Although

membership in the socialist unions has risen from 58*000 to 59,000, in
actuality, there is a strong division within the socialist ranks.

While

the C.G.T. has 35*000 members, a more nationally-oriented union, the
Letzburger Arbechter Verband (L.A.V.), has grown in size to include

2lj.,000 members of the socialist bloc.

30

At the same time, two other unions which reflect other political
affiliations have also become politically prominent.

The Federation

des Employes Privees du Luxembourg (F.E.P.), a moderate, secular body,
and the Letzburger Chrestliche Gowerkschaftsbond (L.C.G.B.), a Catholic
workers union, have attracted 18,000 and 15,000 workers, respectively.
These two unions, together with the L.A.V., have formed the Conseil
National des Syndicats. a government-sponsored sounding board for
worker-oriented desires and grievances.
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A fifth major union, the

railway employees union, falls neither into the camp of the Conseil nor
of the C.G.T.

h2
The array of unions and the growing strength of the non-panEuropean socialist unions suggests that, as Luxembourgers migrated to
the industrial regions, individuals were not absorbed into existing
groups but did indeed band into groups which carried over from their
previous affiliations and which continue to reflect social divisions.
Hence, there is a discrete division between Catholics and Socialists,
and a division between various kinds of socialists.
This argument is very important to the thesis as a whole because
it resolves the question of whether Lorwin’s localism or Daalder *3
elite influence is the proper foundation for the culturing process.
The Catholic prelates and party leaders organized the new workers into
political forces and brought them into the political spectrum as.dis
crete legitimate political units.

The fact that these leaders were al

ready involved in political activity with the secular opposition means
that they were dealing with that opposition on the basis of mutual
recognition of the legitimacy of the two parties, Catholics and secu
larists, to exist in the political intrastructure; i.e., as Daalder
suggests, elite cooperation predated interaction between politicized
groups.

Hence, Lorwin*s idea of separate groups growing together was

not necessary to generate accommodative interaction between distinct
socio-political units.
Once again the idea of mutual recognition of political legitimacy
plays an important role in our discussion.

In the case of Luxembourg

and, as had been mentioned above, Belgium and the Netherlands, as the
different groups found themselves gaining greater political leverage,
they were not ostracised by the elites, but rather the elites made an
effort to integrate the groups into the system as relevant political unit3.

h3

These two ideas, that the desire of elites to cooperate pre-dates
the emergence of potential conflict between diverse groups and the
mutual recognition of political legitimacy, describe the circumstances
necessary to create a political system based on consociational democ
racy.

We can say, then, that consociational democracy arises from a

common recognition of the legitimacy of the regime, the agreed-to forum
for interaction among the elites, and that the system is maintained by
the legitimization of new political forces as they enter the system.
This chapter has described the governments of the Benelux coun
tries and has examined the historical development of their political
cultures.

From this discussion, we have suggested how consociational

democracy arises and, in broad terms, how a system using such a pattern
is maintained.
The next step is an examination of more specific characteristics
of how the system operates.

This analysis will allow us to determine

whether the elite and socio-political characteristics defined in the
previous chapter are sufficient to describe the patterns that arise
from the culturing process we have examined, or whether more or fewer
characteristics are needed.

In addition, we should be able to discover

parameters of individual characteristics which will allow us to deter
mine systematically whether other countries are consociational.

The

interrelationship of political parties, for example, may indicate the
presence of social cleavages or the ability of elites to work together.

1*
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In the discussion on theories of consociational democracy, it was
discovered that an adequate description of a consociational system must
include an analysis of the relationships between elites, between the
elites and society, and between the social blocs.

The previous chapter

indicated that, based on the theory that moderation between discrete
units is the result of a culturing process, the three Benelux countries
are consociational.

We were left, however, with two questions.

First,

is there a pattern of activity which typifies consociational politics,
yet which is more specific than saying accommodative elite interaction
produces moderate politics?

Second, can the characteristics which make

up this pattern be described in a systematic way so that the presence
or absence of consociational political patterns can be determined with
maximum efficiency?
Arend Lijphart isolated several characteristics which together
seemed to provide the pattern desired in our first question.

These

characteristics were:
(1) the presence of distinct social groups which are politically
relevant;
(2 ) elites which have the ability to accommodate the divergent
interests and demands of the blocs, and have the ability to
transcend cleavages and join in common efforts with the elites
of rival blocs;
(3 ) the existence of some degree of national solidarity and some
national symbols.

1+6

Using the information provided in the previous chapter, we can
examine Lijphart1s characteristics and determine their applicability
or if more or fewer characteristics are needed.

We should also be able

to draw upon the previous chapter to determine if there are any parti
cular points of social or political interaction which we can use to
farther refine the characteristics.
Social Cleavages
We know, from the previous chapter, that social cleavages exist
in the Benelux countries.

This fact is not in and of itself remarkable,

as virtually all European countries have some kinds of social cleavage,
either language, religious affiliation, class, or ideological outlook.
The difference between the Benelux countries and other countries is the
way in which the social blocs behave politically.

This section, then,

will examine these differences in political behavior and the inter
relationships which generate them.

Finally, we will look at cleavages

in the countries themselves to see how the relationship between cleav
ages appears in practice.
In the discussion on theories of consociational democracy, it was
mentioned that the relationship between political parties and social
groups generated different types of political activity.

In France,

regional, ideological, and religious groups have been fragmented into
sub-groups and many parties, with several parties representing a single
bloc.

For example, the Gaullists and the catch-all Popular Republican

Movement represent traditional, right-of-center values.

Competition

between all parties is intense, with strong concentrations of larger
parties at the ends of a left-right continuum vying with one another
in efforts to woo the tiny parties inhabiting the center (moderates).

1*8

In Germany, or more properly the Federal Republic of Germany, the
situation is different.

Although there'; are distinctions of class, dia

lect, religion and ideological preference, and regional distinctions,
the political parties are 1catch-all1 parties drawing strength from
several social groups at once.

This is the phenomenon of over-lapping

social cleavages, and it produces a moderate political atmosphere.^
The Benelux countries lie somewhere between the two extremes.
They are different from France because their political activity tends
toward moderation; but, unlike Germany, Benelux political parties tend
to^reflect only one social bloc, such as Catholics, Flemings, or Social
ists.

In Derek TJrwin's words, the cleavages are institutionalized, pro

ducing, in effect, a political system which moderates among discrete
political units.

These units have their own media, trade unions, poli-

tical parties, and, in some cases, educational systems.

2

These political units were generated by the process described in
the discussion on the historical development in Luxembourg in the pre
vious chapter.

As new groups were drawn into the political system,

existing elites provided a framework which individuals could use as a
channel for airing grievances or expressing desires.

The political

parties in a consociational country, therefore, are the visible politi
cal elites of the individual social blocs.
The only problem, then, is showing the linkage between the social
bloc and the political party.

If the pattern of party identification

is similar to the pattern of social cleavages, then we can say that the
system is consociational.

This relationship is useful to know because,

first, it is the only real difference between the consociational and
the moderate systems, and second, elite behavior can then be defined

1+9
in terms of party as well as individual behavior.
The linkage between the blocs and the parties can be shown by the
level of party identification in the individual blocs, a high level
indicating that the conditions which we describe do exist.

If a low

level appeared, the linkage would not be strong, and the political sys
tem would show over-lapping rather than reinforcing cleavages.
The social cleavages in the Benelux countries are basically simi
lar, with a few differences arising from individual circumstances.

The

basic divisions, common to all, are religion vs. secularism and a leftright ideological division.

In the Netherlands, the basic divisions

are complicated by religious sects and by social class.

The religious

parties, which have recently formed a loose association called the
Christian Democratic Alliance or C.D.A., are the Catholic Party, lower
class, fundamentalist Calvinists of the Anti-Revolutionary Party or
A.R.P., and a middle- and upper-class party of less orthodox Calvinists
called the Christian Historical Union (C.H.U.).

Prior to 1972, these

parties operated with complete independence, and it is only recently
that they felt circumstances demanded they form a united front.

The

circumstances that caused this union will be discussed later.
The class division also manifests itself in the left-right ideo
logical cleavage, the secular lower- and lower-middle classes belonging
largely to the Socialists, while the rest of the secular middle class,
together with the upper class, adhere

to the Liberal Party.

Although

there are other splinters, over the long run these five blocs* have
accounted for in excess of 85% of the voting population of the Nether
lands.
*Catholics, Socialists, Liberals, strong Calvinist (ARP), weak
Calvinist (CHU).

In Luxembourg, the formula of religious-secular and left-right
accounts for the bulk of Luxembourg1s politicized divisions.

There is

no real history of class conflict, and virtually everyone is a nominal
Catholic.

All Luxembourgers are at least bi-lingual, speaking Letzem-

burgish, a local dialect, and either Frencii or German.

The use of

Letzemburgish provides a linguistic over-lap, preventing social ostra
cism for speaking a different language.

Likewise, both French and Ger

man are used in schools, so no students are held back because of langu
age.
There are a few regional isms in Luxembourg which have been grow
ing over time.

The north-west is largely rural and produces conserva

tive, traditionalist Catholics.

The new industrial areas, in middle

and eastern Luxembourg, have been growing only in the last fifty years,
also have this flavor, having gained many individuals who migrated from
the rural north-west. In the older industrial areas of the south, there
t
is an admixture of different groups in Luxembourg-City, and concentra
tions of specific groups in other cities, most notably the strong
Communist bloc in Esch-zur-Alzette.
Belgian cleavages also follow the basic format described above.
With the addition of the language and regional cleavages— Flemish in
Flanders, French in Wallonia, German in the Cantons of the East, and
both French and Flemish in Brussels— a new complication is added in that
all political parties are required by law to have a separate political
machine for each area.

In other words, there are religious and secular

blocs and ideological blocs which are unique to each region.

Flanders,

Wallonia, and Brussels also have a party unique to the area whose pri
mary impact is only in national politics.

These are the language
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parties, intent on defending cultural integrity.
An interesting part of Belgium cleavages is that Wallonia tends
politically toward the traditions of French liberalism while Flanders
maintains older values.

Wallonia tends to be more secular and desires

greater amounts of government-supplied social welfare.

Flanders tends

to be more moderate, and Catholics still hold a strong position poli
tically.
One factor which must be heavily emphasized is that the major
cleavages in all three countries are strong and politically relevant.
Here Yal Lorwin's idea of localism as an influence re-emerges.

Coun

tries like Germany and Great Britain have each engendered an ethos
where>all groups feel that the state has over-shadowed diversity.^
This ethos moderates the effect of social cleavages because individuals,
when policy places no threat to them directly, are willing to go with
the general flow of national policy.

Lorwin suggests, as a result,

that in spite of common recognition of cleavages, the political impact
c
of the cleavages is light to moderate.
Characteristics of cleavages,
such as the media, education, party identification, and socio-economic
organizations such as labor unions, and the bureaucracy, will, with a
few exceptions, display a low to medium range of cleavages.^

In Bri

tain, the only characteristics that really show a strong cleavage arise
from the perquisites of class, hence education and elements of the
bureaucracy will show social segmentation.

In Germany, there are few

characteristics which do not fit into a middle-range or low-range cate
gory.

-This means that it would be very difficult to determine someone's

social identification by determining his political affiliation.
This conclusion is borne out by the actual circumstances in the

countries*

In Germany, J0% of ail industrial workers ‘belong* to the

Social Democratic Party.

7

The remainder are broken up among the other

major parties and, indeed, form the primary foundation for the strength
of virtually all parties.

8

This figure is lower than for Scandanavian,

British or Belgian Social Democratic Labor parties and also lower than
Communist-Socialist voting blocs in Prance and Italy.
more homogeneously working class than British Labor.

It was, however,
It was a working-

class party, but not a party of the whole working class.

A similar

situation exists in Great Britain.
In the Benelux countries, on the other hand, the situation is the
reverse from Great Britain or Germany,

Characteristics of religious-

party identification, trade union membership, media, and education all
indicate a high degree of social segmentation.

9

This segmentation

translates into relatively strong predictibility with regards to the
relationship between social bloc and party preference.
The Netherlands is the only country for which a direct study was
available.

Tables A and B show the relationship between religious and

party preference and between occupation and party preference.

Table A

shows a drift from the less orthodox Dutch Reformed Church to the secu
lar ranks, while the Catholic and Reformed Churches (orthodox) remain
strong.

This trend is especially interesting in view of the general

decline of Calvinism over the last two centuries.

It was during the

early 1800's that the Dutch Reformed Church broke free politically as
an upper-class movement.

Since 1900, the Dutch Reformed Church has

undergone a serious decline, falling from being the largest church (i+8%)
to third place (28%) behind the Catholics and the Reformed Church.^
The Catholics grew to from about 35% to

probably through normal

S3
I
rH
d
-P
O
EH

© O
1
—I C'—
ftlA
A fk
Co r l
CQ w

■p d

i
\A
CM

0
rH

CM
CM

0
rH

-d

ca

CM

1A
CM

vo

O
CM

G)
'3

V

H
d

o

-P

> VO
a 0 vo
0 G CV1
p

RELIGION

AND PARTY PREFERENCE

(%) I96I1**

p
<D
ft
•p
O

O
CM

rH
rH

VO

C—
rH

t—

\A

-d
CA

O
CM

c—
VO

CA
rH

d

GO

CM

CM

O
CM

VO
rH

-d

CO

-d

CM

CA
r—

-d
CM

•
>
© S>S'-^
f t P CA
P -d
•H d rH
P f t ' —'

CM

1
—1

CO

CM
CM

rH
VO

1A

CM

rH

0
CA

o\
VO

p 00
P CM
d ca
ft w

in

vo

0
ON

O

rH
t—

CO

IA
rH

ca

rH

CM

CM
rH

C—
CO

•

©
€

0

ft

p
O
O

0
p

ft

s
© ft
t>
O -d
a vo
os
r—1
f tp
0 ra
•H
G
h
P G •H

d
© ftp
0
©
rH

ft ,p d

G
©
M

a

p

ON

rH

-d

OS
CO

-d

OS

VA

ca

O
OS

\A

© O

d

P H rH
0 0 d rH
I
G «H G i—
© *rH O

1A

tQ ft
•H
p
B
o o
d
01 frl
0)
©
•§ s P
d
1 3 «H
o
ft
©
o
©
d
m
©
G

O

o

© ft
P

C*-

as

CM

O

rH
-d

ca

rH

0

-d

0

c*CA

0

VO

O
OS

OS
CO

0
rH

«H

$
ft

©
Q
Jj
fQ
G
©
ft
p
d

G
0
•iH
•H
rH
©
ft

©
>
0

eg a)

CM
VO
-d
^

bQ

P

©
.S .
ft 1
• ©
O R
P «H p
ft
G p
©
a 0

p

0
•H
rH
O
ft
ft
d
0

©

© §
ft
in m
t4

5

-P
P
d
ft

•

G

ft ©
0 ft
p
d .
© «H
i
O
«H
©
ft

1
—1

P
O
ft
d
ft

P

P R

•
-p
OQ
•H G ^
f t O E—
•H - d
• 2 rH
8 R '-'
r*-l
O

r s'- '
P rH
P -d
d rH
ft

£

•H

O
ft P
O P

0)
©
■H
p >n
P co
d
'
ft

rH
iu
P
(D
ft
*H
ft

cS

0
•H
rH
0
ft
p
d

p
d
rH
P
So
©
P

©
0
d
rrt
G
©
P
P
d
P
d
0 d
•h P
rH 5(3
0 ©
ft p
p p
d *H
O '—

*
d
©
a
p
0
ft
©
ft

d
d
G
©
p
ft
d

*
d
©
a
p
0
ft
© P
ft d
rH
ft ?
0 So
p ©
P P
R w

*
d
©
a
p
O
ft
©
ft
ft
0
ft
P
R

rrt
G
©
P
P
d
,
p
d
H
p
So
©
p
p
*H

O
0) o
d

ft o
o ©

•r—N
©
O
C

©
Q

•H
P

d

rH

P
©
ft
P
O

G
0
•H
So
•r|
rH
©
ft
O

1
—1
ft
O
•rH
rH
O
ft
P
d
0

O
O
rH
ft
P
d
rH
P
O
©
CO

O
O
rH
ft
ft
©
•d
2
•rH
t>
rH
d
O

P

©
<0
P

d
o ft
•§
#cJ d s d
<11 ©
'
frA
P
O ft
ch O d
<D IQ
©
©
p
ft
—1
p i
0)
0)
ft d
I & 0) EH
* o p *
ft f t *
d iH ©
G d p

O
O

0)

So

I t u
©
G
0
•H
SO
•H
rH
©
ft

•p

P

Sh

H IA
ci ON
P lA

$1

EH rH

CA

o •»

-p

^

P

o CO

-d
CM

-d
CA

-d

rH

CA I
CM I

ON
ON

0O

31
vo

-d

CM
CM

CO
CM

CM

o.

<0.
CM I

-d

-d

vo
i—i

—d

cm

r—

cm

-d I
rH I

ON

ca

rH
CM i

O
O

.

°
O

H o

<J) X A

I s
O

on

si

•H - d

P
O

rP

AND PARTY PREFERENCE

(%) 19ok

P

CQ
•H P ^
w O f-

>
<D/•—s
Ph CA
1J

31

*H rH
-P

CM |

rH

gjv'-"

P CM
0) - d
P rH

•H ^

_d
CM

JL

'x r T

rH

-l a

O

ca

XA I rH
CM I O

OCCUPATION

►P

-p

CQ
•H ^ '
rH 1A

31

•H -d

CM

cdVO
O v—

O
03

O
•H

rH P

O

5

ca

S

CA
CM

-d

ON

31

CA

P CA

cti

CM

CV1

CM

a)

CA

CO

CM

ON

o

ca
eg
P

rH
a

o

p
a)

Pi

f
O

o

CQ

©

P

•H
©
P
w

O
•H

m
CQ
0)
«H
o
£

p

cd
rH
1
—1
o
o
1
©
p
•«H

§

o
o

rH

CD

p

P

<d

©

O
1
0
P
rH
m

£

rH
rH
O

I

d

Pi

td
Pi

a
O
•H
P

od
&
o
o

o

o

S3

population growth.

While the Reformed Church has remained at a stable

level, the secular bloc has grown to about 18%.

12

We also have, on

Table B, the fact that the Dutch Reformed Church's political party, the
Christian Historical Union, is split about 1*0-30% be w e e n middle to
upper-class people and blue-collar workers.

This pair of circumstances

suggests that the C.H.U. and the Dutch Reformed Church have been, at
least for a while, a sort of social cross-over point from Orthodox
Calvinism to political secularism.
over generations.

The process is slow, taking place

It is the kind of social change, coupled with a sud

den increase in strength and number of splinter parties which has led
some writers, such as Lorwin, Lijphart and others, to suggest that the

blocs are disappearing.

13

Table C shows this trend as between 191*6

and 1972 there is a substantial decline in the strength of the Big Five
parties.

This strength was being lost to the newer splinter parties

rather than to the old ones.
The 1977 election suggests a reversal of this trend as the
strength of the Christian Democratic Alliance has stabilized, while the
traditional Socialist and Liberal parties have blossomed into secular
giants. •The splinters have fallen to half of their previous strength.
This reversal has taken place since the authors began predicting the
decline of blocs.

In spite of the turmoil, all that has really occurred

is that there has been a realignment of the blocs toward greater secu
larism and a united-front approach to politics among the religious
parties.

The discussion so far gives us two characteristics of con

sociational political parties in the Netherlands:
(l) the distribution of votes among the various political parties
will be relatively stable, i.e., changes will come from the
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TABLE C
SECOND CHMBER ELECTIONS IN TEE NETHE5LANDS
191*6-1959. 1963, 1967, 1971, 1972, and 1977 (%)

191+61959

1963

1967

1971

1972

1977

Labor

29.2

28.0

23.5

21+.7

27.1+

35.0

Catholic

30.8

31.9

26.5

21.9

17.7 )

Anti-Revolutionary

11.3

8.7

9.9

8.6

8.8 JC.D.A.
) 32.0

Christian Historical
Union

8.5

8.6

8.1

6.3

1+.8

Liberal

8.8

10*3

10.7

10.4

11+.1+

18.7

Communist

6.3

2.8

3.6

3.9

1+.5

1.3

2.2

2.3

2.0

2.3

2.2

2.0

Ref, Pol. League

0.1+

0.8

0.9

1.6

1.8

0.6

Pacifist Socialist

0.1+

3.0

2.9 .

1.1+

1.5

0.6

Farmers

0.1

2.1

1+.7

1.1

1.9

0.6

Democrats *66

—

—

1+.5

6.8

1+.2

5.3

Bern. Socialists *70

—

—

—

5.3

l+.l

0.6

Radical

—

—

- -

1.8

1+.8

2.0

0.9

0.0

Political Reformed
t

Roman Catholic
Other

1.9

1.5

2.7

3.9

1.1

1.3

88.6

87.5

78.7

71.9

73.0

85.7

Old Splinter Parties

9.1+

8.9

9.1+

9.2

10.0

5.3

New Splinter Parties

0.1

2.1

9.2

15.0

15.9

8.0

Big Five
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gradual growth or decline of a political bloc.

Although

parties may gain or lose 3-1+ percentage points, major gains
or losses (over ten points) will occur only over many years,
and several elections.
(2) When new parties appear, they will tend to be off-shoots from
older parties, rather than being completely new parties.

In

non-consociational countries, where parties represent ideo
logies rather than social units, new parties are created when
a new ideology becomes popular.

In consociational countries,

splinter parties will tend to represent extreme factions of
existing blocs.

Also, when the need for a splinter is gone,

the splinter disappears in a short time.
The salient cleavages in Belgium and Luxembourg, unlike the
Netherlands, have not been broken down by party identification.

This

is because most studies examine only the language problem in Belgium,
and Luxembourg is so small that few researchers bother to study deeper
than the surface characteristics.

As a result, the linkage between the

political parties and the social groups can only be established by com
paring voting patterns with various cleavages.

By determining where a

party*s strength lies, we can ascertain whether there is a relationship
between group and party.

This process, in the case of Belgium, is

aided greatly by the law which requires separate party machinery in
each language region.

A second indicator of the linkages is a compari

son of the changes in society with the changes in the parties.

In the

*An exception is Democrats *66, a party fostered by young intel
lectuals during the mid-1900*s. Democrats '66 favors the dissolution
of the existing systems, seeking to replace the bloc system with a
pragmatic model.

case of Luxembourg, this is only information which points to the relai

tionship.

Although this is probably the weakest of the possible

approaches, it is .the only one which can be used under the circum
stances.
Belgian cleavages, as was mentioned earlier, are similar to
cleavages in the Netherlands, but are further complicated by the pre
sence of a cleavage arising from a division of language and culture.

The cleavages between Catholics and secularists and between various
ideological groups on a left-right continuum arose during the l800!s.

The language crisis did not become a dominant political problem until
the 1900*3. When the language boundary was established in 1932, Bel
gium was divided into three regions, Flanders, Wallonia, and the capif
tal, Brussels. Each of these regions is dominated by political affili

ates of the majority language group,

At the same time, these regions

are not homogeneous enclaves, because, as Shepard Clough noted in a
study on Belgium cities, as much as five to fifteen percent of a given
city*s population might be of a different ethnic origin than the major. ity of citizens.

15

Hence, in the study of the individual regimes, we

can expect that there will be significant minorities which will vote in

a pattern predominant to another region, i.e., although the division
shown by the data will be strong, the split will not be perfect.
Before examining the individual regions in Belgium, let us study

the country as a whole.

The various social blocs have political par

ties, the relationship between the various parties being delineated in
Figure 1.

In 197U> the Flemish section of the Christian Social Party

(P.S.C.) became the C.V.P., the Christli.jke Volksparti.j.

All other

parties are secular except Yolksunie, which includes some defense of
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FIGURE 1
BELGIAN PARTIES

Flemish

LEFT

Communist s-

French

-Communists and Democratic and
Progressive Union

Belgian Socialist Party-

-Belgian Socialist Party

4/alloon Rally (language)

Democratic Front of Francophones
“(language) F.D.F.

C.V.P.*

-P.S.C,

Party for Liberty and
Progress (PVV)-------

Party for Liberty and Progress
■(now: Party of refoims and
liberty) PLP-PRLW

Volksunie-

RIGHT
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Catholicism in its program of regionalism.

Liberal parties, the F W

(Party of Liberty and Progress) and its French counterpart, the PELW,
control the secular-right vote.
Table D lists the election returns since 189^4-*

The two parties

which have maintained the largest following since the passage of uni
versal suffrage in 1919 are the P.S.C. (now PSC-CVP) and the Socialists.
The P.S.C. attracts relatively conservative, traditional, strong Catho
lics, mostly from Flanders.

The Socialists, on the other hand, repre

sent the old secular left, attracting the workers from Wallonia where
the older established industries are located and where traditional
French egalitarianism is strong.
The Liberals, once a single party, are, functionally, several
parties because of confusion from the law requiring separate political
organizations in each region.

These parties represent the secular

middle class, especially those whose traditions arise from French
Liberalism and egalitarianism which arose during the l800fs.

Their

ideas of egalitarianism are those of old-style liberalism, where indi
viduals are responsible for their own well-being while the state merely
forms a framework for their common actions.

It is interesting to note

that except for the sharp decline of 1919 and the great expansion of
19^9 and 1965, the Liberals have fluctuated only slightly, a few per
centage points at a time.
The other parties in Belgium have arisen from crises.

When the

Communists and Rexists and new marginal parties blossomed into their
greatest levels, political turmoil was at its greatest.

The Depression

of the 1930's and the language troubles of the early 1960fs caused many
individuals to leave the main blocs and join these more militant fringe
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TABLE D 16
BELGIAN ELECTION BETDBNS 1894-1978

1894
1896-8
1900
1902-4
1906-8
1912
1919
1921
1925
1929
1932
1936
1939
1946
1949
1950
1954
1958
1961
1965
1968
1971
1974
1977
1978

51.6
50.7
48.5
49.8
48.6
51.0
36.0
37.0
36.1
35.4
38.6
27.7
32.7
42.5
43.6
47.7
41.1
46.5
44.5
34.5
31.74
30.05
32.34
35.94
[38.6

17.4
23.6
20.5
20.6
21.5
22.0
36.6
32*.& *
39.3
36.0
37.1
32.1
30.2
32.4
29.8
35.?
38.5
37.0
36.7
28.3
27.99
27.27
26.66
26.43
12.2
15.0

28.5
22.2
24.3
23.3
26.7
25.1
17.6
18.8
14.6
16.6
14.3
12.4
17.2
9.6
15.3
12.1
13.1
12.0
11.1
21.6
20.88
16.39
15.19
15.55
10.3
7.0

2.6
3.0
3.9
6.3
5.9
7.1
8.3
—
2.1
—
2.2
2.0
3.5
6.8
9.78
11.11
10 <2
9.75
^6.6

2.4
5.9
11.23
10.94
7.7
7.0

1.3
1.6
1.7
2.1
1.9
0.3
6.5
7.4
5.9
5.7
4.1
17.6
3.2 ('Rexists)
11.6
<Comm. & Rex.)
12.7
2.7 (Other)
9.4
(kComm. & other)
4.8
5.1
2.6
6.0
6.4
3.3
.41(Other)
3.08
.81
3.23
1.44
2.7
1.6
K

7

'S
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groups.

As troubles subsided, these parties either shrank to a con

stant figure, as with the Communists' three percent for three consecu
tive elections, or have vanished completely.
The language parties are of a similar nature, by and large.

The

Flemish Volksunie, the Walloon Bally, and the Front Democratique des
Francophones of Brussels all arose quickly during the long language
crisis of the 1960's and, now that the situation is being resolved,
have gone into a slow decline.

Walloon Bally will probably disappear

over the long run, absorbed by the Socialists.

Volksunie may survive

because it represents a conservative group with some Christian party
overtones, combining values which would otherwise be lost in the
middle-of-the-road policies of the Christian Socials.

The FDF may

also survive, for much the same reason; that is, it attracts liberal,
secular, French-speakers who are not as conservative as the Liberals,
nor as liberal as the Socialists.
The relationships described above are reinforced by the voting
patterns in the individual regions.

In Wallonia, for example, over

half of the population voted for leftist parties, most of these having
voted for the Socialists.

The P.S.C., a mass party (no pun intended),

came in second with about twenty-five percent, while the Liberals
finished third with about eighteen percent (see Table E).
By contrast, the voting in Flanders reflects different circum
stances.

Except for the ports like Antwerp

and a few textile cities

like Ghent and Brugge (Bruges), most of the factories of Flanders are
very new, many having been built with money from the American Marshall
Plan program.

When French culture was imported, it spread mostly in

the cities and among the bourgeoisie.

The predominantly agricultural

lower-class Flemings retained their traditional Catholic outlook, as
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TABLE E1T
REGIONAL BREAKDOWN OP THE 1977 BELGIAN ELECTION

\ ■ Flanders— 3 ,2U6,06I4.

Brussels— 622,820
P.S.C.
P.L.P.
P.S.B.
F.D.F.
R.W.
P.C.&Other

112,932
9,738
c.200,000*
237,280
1,297
c. 25,000*

18.11
1.56
32.11
1+3.9
.2
1+.2

♦Estimates

1+30,676
319,833
61+3,1+28
157,262
33,862
93,517
26,928

1,1+59,997
1+75,912
c.63O,000*
599,631+
c. 30,000*
c. 60,000*

%
hb. 9
11+.6
c,,20.0*
18.1+
1.0

Known
Brussels & Flanders— 3,868,881+

Wallonia— 1,705,31+6
P.S.C.
P.L.P.
P.S.B.
R.W.
Cartel RW-PSB
P.C.
Other

C.V.P.
P.V.V.
P.S.B.
v .tj.
P.C.
Other

%
25.25
18.75
37.73
9.22
1.98
5.1*8
1.58

P.S.B.
P.O.
Other

829,901
$7,901*
62,088

*
21.1*5
1.1*9
1.6
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did the nobility and part of the bourgeoisie.
was lost to French secularism.

Most of the middle class

This is again borne out by the voting

described in Table E, where 1+1$ of the vote in Flanders went to the
C.V.P., the pro-Catholic party, and another 18% went to what amounts
to the Catholic far right, Yolksunie.

Of the secular parties, the lower-

class Socialist Party, with its mass appeal, did better than did the
middle-class Liberals (P.V.Y.).
An interesting note is that the language parties from the two
regions, Yolksunie and Walloon Rally, are off-shoots from the major
party of the region, Yolksunie from the C.Y.P., and Walloon Rally from
the Socialists.

In addition, the difference in the strength of the

Communist Party in the two regions sharpens the image- of a liberal
Wallonia and a conservative Flanders.
The results for Brussels are to be expected from the nature of
a capital city.

The city has traditions of French liberalism which

controlled the country until the passage of universal suffrage in 1919*
As a capital, it is filled with civil servants, bankers, and a plethora
of service-type agencies.
middle-class community.

Hence, Brussels can be characterized as a
It is not surprising, then, that the FDF, which

was described above, is the dominant party in the city.

The poor

showing of Walloon Rally suggests that the growth of the FDF represents
as much a split in the liberal party as a move to protect linguistic
and cultural integrity.

The second-and third-place showings by the

Socialists and P.S.C. are to be expected as the parties represent the
older choices of French liberalism and Catholicism.

The third 'old*

party, the Liberals, took a beating because the liberalism of the FDF
is more acceptable to some m od em middle-class liberals than the old-style

bourgeois liberalism.
As expected, the political cleavages in Belgium flow along lines
of religion and class.

Language parties will survive only by being

convenient vehicles for particular sub-segments of existing blocs.
Most political activity, now that the cultural groups have been safely
separated, will continue to reflect the cultural backgrounds of the
parties, but language, per se, will probably decline as a point of
major political contention.

The discussion on language re-emerges

under the discussion of the elites.
Luxembourg’s cleavages fit the basic pattern attributed to the
other two Benelux countries in that there are Catholic and secular
blocs and division along a left-right ideological continuum.

The

governments in the past have worked to prevent other potential cleav
ages from becoming problems.
92% Catholic.

In the case of religion, the country is

Protestant and Jewish minorities are under the protec

tion of the State, being administered by government-sponsored organi
zations.

Although everyone in Luxembourg speaks the local dialect of

Letzemburgish, the country is split into bi-lingual or tri-lingual
bodies, speaking Letzemburgish and French or German, or all three.
The schools are organized bi-lingually so that if a student’s family
language is French, he is not handicapped in the. pursuit of an educa
tion.

The common use of Letzemburgish provides a comfortable overlap

for all language groups.

18

The cleavages which continue to exist have been exacerbated by
industrialization.

France had exerted a strong influence on Luxem

bourg, especially among the Francophones of the south-west.

In 1839

most of the south-west, together with most Francophone Luxembourgers

66
and a healthy portion of Luxembourg's industrial base, was given to
Belgium.

South-western Luxembourg today is very similar to Belgian

Luxembourg; it is an old industrial area and tends toward the secularleft, especially toward the Socialists.

An extreme case is the great

steel center of Esch-zur-Alette which has a strong Communist enclave.
In 1839, most of the rest of Luxembourg was similar to Flanders,
that is, it was predominantly Catholic, traditional, conservative, and
rural.

Since the turn of the century, much of this rural population

has migrated to the industrial cities.

19

As was mentioned in the pre

vious chapter, these people have tended to join organizations which
provided familiar surroundings, such as Catholic trade unions and other
religious organizations.
The bureaucracy, the old nobility, the prelates, and what little
bourgeoisie that existed encouraged the politicization of Catholic
values.

As these leaders controlled virtually all parliamentary acti

vity prior to 1867, and controlled the capital city completely, it is
not surprising that, by the 1930fs, the Catholic party was pre-eminent
with the Socialist workers placing second in most elections (see Table
F).

This division continues to the present day.
This growing division between Catholics and Socialists, created

by social migration, has been paralleled by changes in other parties.
Before 191+0, for example, there were some farmers’ parties which were
independent from the urban-based Catholics.
declined, these parties died out.

As the rural population

The real change in Luxembourg poli

tics, however, is the growth of the secular rightand center.
In the 1930's, the Liberals were a small, right-wing, secular
party.

In 1937, the party broke in two, forming the conservative

67
r-i ra

aj +>
o a>

-p aJ

1A
CM

VO
CM

rH
XA

rH
\A

CVJ
XA

I

I

I

I

I

I

O

I

t

O

I

rH

CM
XA

CM.
"LA

VO
"LA

. VO
XA

VO
XA

OV
XA

I

I

I

I

VO

XA

I

I

I

CM

O

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

Eh CQ

H
Gj I a
•H o -P
o a
0) (4
CQ R

O

P4
1
CQ
a> -p 0
0
Pi 0
a> a> Pj
»d *d pi
d
0
H
ft

0
0

I

I

d

i

0

0)
ft
0
rd

0

+9
S
0
'd

H

o

+9
CQ
•H
H
CO
•H
O
O
CQ

I

I

I

I

I

|

XA

O

I

I

I

I

I

CM.

ft

a

Pi £

Q) 0}

rH

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

XA

XA

Hi"

CA

CA

XA

VO

VO

XA

CM
v—<"

ON

OV

OO

VO

rH
rH -

VO

rH
rH

rH
rH

-O
rH

C-

rH
i—I

-= f
rH

GO
i—I

CrH

t—
rH

H'
CM

CO
rH

'CM
rH

C—
rH

in 19U5*

ft

H
CQ
1 +9
0 03
o •d
o 0
/-S
CQ CQ
-P i— 1
cd cd

0 0
o 0
O R
a •H
0 R
R'w'

I
*h a*'-**

(A

rl

O 'H

fit O

0J
+>

XA

d O O

R CQ *H

I
•H

*

03

So

CA
CA
XA
CM
rH
VO
rH
CM
i—I
rH
CO
i H r H C M C M C M C M C M C M C M C M H

fii •H O

O +> CQ

(D
JH

i—!
CA
ON
rH

CA
ON
rH

VO
-dON
rH

CO
JON
rH

rH
XA
ON
rH

-=f
XA
ON
rH

ON
XA
ON
i—1

-0"
VO
ON
rH

OO
vo
ON
1—1

i.
rH

l>ON
rH

Ht
c—
ON
rH

*The Catholic became the Christian

3
EH

Social Party

'b *d

**Split between

03

Socialists and Social Democrats occurred between
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Liberal Party and the moderate Democrat Party.
merged as the Democrat Party.

In 19^6> these parties

Their strength remained about the same

for some years with the low ebb coming in the mid-1950's when economic
confusion arose from problems with the integration of the Benelux coun
tries.

In a show of pro-integration solidarity, many individuals

rallied to the support of the Christian Social Party’s efforts.

Since 195U> the secular-center and right have blossomed as never
before because of the increased government efforts to encourage the
development of service-oriented activities, such as international bank
ing, rather than relying exclusively on the steel industry to maintain
economic stability.

These efforts have expanded the bureaucracy and

the number of white-collar workers in private industry to the point
that there ,are more service-workers than industrial laborers.

This ex

pansion has expanded the middle class and has caused a deterioration
of ithe solidity of the secular-left.
&

Moderate factions in the Socialist and Democrats parties have

broken with the main body and struck out on their own.

In the case of

the Democrats, the break was short-lived, the faction, known as the
Mouvement Independent Pouulaire (MIP) having quickly disappeared.

The

Democrats have more recently gained a large number of votes from the
Christian Social Party and have emerged as a very important political
unit.
As for the secular left, the Socialists lost a fraction, which
became the Social Democrats, and which will probably not return to the
parent party.

The PSD represent the part of the Socialist bloc which

has been drawn into the middle class.

Although they adhere to the

principles of the old bloc, there are differences in programs such that

69
the Socialists have been backing policies which threaten the new-found
livelihood of the PSD voters.

The split itself was actually precipi

tated, for example, by a decision by the main leadership to support the
Communists in certain municipal elections.

21

The Communists, who gain about the same vote at every election with
remarkable consistency, are adherents of Stalin’s approach to creating a
Communist state, such as the destruction of the elements which retard the

transition.

For example, they were on record as having praised the 1968

Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia.

To the PSD, the Communists are

too fundamentally different to indulge in any association.
.v

The cleavages in Luxembourg have changed insofar as an alteration

in the basic structure of society; the expansion of the middle class
has caused the blocs themselves to change in size and has created a new
bloc, the Social Democrats.
Do these cleavages create institutionalized political blocs?

The

outer trappings, such as media and labor-union organization, do inaicate a high degree of segmentation,

22

but there may still be some ques

tion as to whether the relationship between bloc and party characteris
tic of consociational democracies is present here.

The only real means

to determine this, given the scarcity of information on Luxembourg, is
to briefly re-examine the nature of political activity in Germany.

In

both Germany and Luxembourg, there are three relevant political parties,
discrete social cleavages, and cooperative, moderate political inter
action.

Germany’s political parties are catch-all parties, i.e., al

though a party may be especially attractive to a particular group, the
political party does not identify itself with that group alone, seeking
instead to maximize votes by issuing a general appeal.

In Germany, the

70
lower classes were brought into the political arena as a new, distinct
unit, the Social Democratic Party, independent of the upper- and middleclass factions already extant.

Since the 1950's, the Social Democrats

have modified their goals and programs so as to be attractive to a
broader range of voters.

23

Luxembourg’s workers were incorporated into the existing frame
work of political interaction by elite encouragement.

Bather than

creating new influences, then, the workers have expanded support for
the existing system.

Since the existing elites were divided into pro-

Catholic and pro-secular groups, it is a reasonable supposition, then,
that the segmentation of society is present in the relationship between
the political parties and society, and that the political interaction
in Luxembourg can be explained by consociationalism.
The examination of the three Benelux countries has shown that the
changes in social blocs caused by social migration and economic expan
sion are paralleled by changes in the strength and number of political
parties.

We have also seen that the blocs can, if circumstances demand

it, split into factions.

The maintenance of relations between those

factions require the same kind of interaction that would be expected
between the blocs themselves.

Elite activity, then, plays a vital role

in coordinating the efforts of the blocs.

It is in this light that we

turn to the discussion of consociational elites.
Elite Interaction
The second characteristic in Lijphart’s description of consocia
tional politics has two parts:

first, that elites have the ability to

accommodate diverse interests of rival sub-cultures and, secondly, that
the elites are able to transcend cleavages and to join in common efforts
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with, elites of rival sub-cultures.

We have already seen that both

elites and society as a whole have been cultured by the mechanics of
the system to recognize the legitimacy and integrity of other social
groups, and to seek the good of their group through the growth of the
whole.

What we seek in this section is some indicator which shows

that the different elites are indeed working together and some speci
fic qualities of the political systems which permit this kind of elite
interaction.
The discussion in the previous chapter provided a relatively
simple means to determine if the elites of rival sub-cultures can
interact for the mutual benefit of the sub-cultures.

It was discovered

that, in the case of segmented societies, the elites of a given social
groups will be, by and large, congruent with the political party which
represents,the group.

There may be other individuals who exert an

influence on policy-making, but the visible elite interaction will be
in the hands of the parties.

Carrying this a step further, the ability

of the* elites to interact will be shown by the ability of the parties
to associate freely in coalitions, regardless of ideological or reli
gious conviction.
What about other characteristics of coalitions?

The rate of change

from one coalition to another should be relatively slow, about the rate
of the regular elections.

This slow rate exists because the Cabinet

is not so likely to be brought down because of ideological questions as
would occur in say France or Italy.

Policy is given a greater chance

to succeed because the Opposition is not utterly opposed to any and
every Cabinet proposal.

Variance from this norm, however, is not

necessarily significant as special elections arise from special
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circumstances.

Over the long run, the rate of change should not

approach that of a new cabinet being created every year or so, as
occurs in Italy, but some rapid changes are not impossible.
The party that produces the prime minister is not significant
either, as a formateur, a person who must form a cabinet coalition,
may be chosen because of their leadership within the party, their
popularity among the members of other parties, or because, even though
an individual may hold only a middle-range position in his party, the
monarch has been advised of the individual’s integrity, intelligence,
and wise policies.

When coalitions are formed, the prime minister

might not even be from the majority party.

In short, a prime minister

could be from any party, even though the tendency in the long run is
to give the position to the head of the biggest party.

This trait is

not found exclusively in the Benelux countries, but also occurs in
Prance and other competitive systems.
Tables G, H, and I delineate the coalitions in the three Benelux
countries over the last forty or so years.

Although some coalitions,

especially in Luxembourg, contain the same parties, the actual arrange
ment of the coalition depends on the size of the electoral victory.

A

substantial victory by one party will give it grounds to demand a pro
portional increase in the number of ministries that it controls.
We can see in the case of the Netherlands (Table G) that even
though electoral success has moved from party to party, few parties
have formed coalitions without crossing ideological or religious lines.
This is shown strongly in the results of the 1972 and 1977 elections.
In the early 1970's, as has been mentioned, scholars like Lorwin
and Lijphart felt that the blocs were fragmenting and that, as a result,
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TABLE
THE NETHERLANDS:

G

2k

CABINET COALITIONS, 1933-1977

1933

ARP, Catholic, Radical, Liberal

1937

C.H.1J., ARP, Labor (then Social-Democrats), Liberal, Catholic

19¥

Catholi c, Labor

1948

Labor, Catholic, Liberal, C.H.U.

1952

Labor, Catholic, ARP, C.H.U.

1956

Labor, Catholic, ARP, C.H.U.

1959

Catholics, Liberal, C.H.U., ARP

1963

Catholic, Liberal, C.H.U., ARP

1967

Catholic, Liberal, C.H.U., ARP

1971

Labor, Democrats, ’66, Catholic, ARP

1972

Labor, Democrats ’66, Radical, Catholic, ARP

1977

C.D.A. (Catholic, C.H.U., ARP), Liberals

NOTE; The first party in each coalition is the dominant party. In
1977> Labor won a relative majority, but could not negotiate
an absolute majority coalition.

7U
consociational democracy was in decline.

This tendency was recognized

by Joop den Uyi's Labor (Socialist) Party which felt that this trend
was good and sought to capitalize upon it.

Their intention was to dis

solve the blocs entirely to allow more rapid social reform.

They hoped

to build sufficient support among Labor1s allies to create an absolute
majority (more than

50%

of the seats), thus making accommodation with

religious and secular-right parties unnecessary.

Although they did

unite a substantial part of the left, their efforts, for better or for
worse, fell short of the mark.
In response to the challenge of den Uyl, the religious parties
and the right-secular bloc also reformed their policies.
to compromise but are cautious in their interaction.

They continue

Labor, the

Liberals, and the C.D.A. each have enough votes to prevent any one of
the other two from forming a majority coalition with splinter parties
alone.

Two of the three is the minimum combination for forming any

coalition, except for the weakest of minorities.

At the same time,

the splinter panties represent so many different attitudes that creat
ing a consensus among them would be difficult.

In short, the distribu

tion of authority has returned to a somewhat altered, yet generally
unchanged, form of the pre-1960 arrangement.
The I972 den Uyl government, which had consisted of the Labor
Party, the Radicals, Democrats *66, the Catholics, and the A.R.P.,
could not be rebuilt after the 1977 elections.
Labor with the new C.D.A. failed.

Attempts to combine

Instead, a center-right coalition

of the C.D.A. and the Liberals was formed under Van Agt.

25

The results of these elections suggest that, in the Netherlands
rule by a single bloc, in this case the secular-left bloc of Labor,

Democrats *66 and the Radical Party, is not yet politically possible.
Successful government still depends upon the ability of the diverse
elites to negotiate mutually agreeable programs.

The consolidation of

the religious parties and the general decline of the small parties
indicate that the deterioration of the blocs has slowed and the blocs
are once again becoming rigid.
Table E lists the Belgian coalitions including changes which did
not involve elections.

As with the Dutch, the Belgians join freely in

coalitions, regardless of ideological or religious preference.

In a

country with several major cleavages, it is interesting to note that
the results of the last two elections indicate that the people expected
coalition members to behave in a consociational fashion.
In 1975, Walloon;Rally joined a coalition of C.V.P. (Flemish
Catholic) and Liberals.

In 1977» W.R. leaders claimed that Prime Minis

ter Leo Tindemans was moving too slowly on implementing programs to
jurisdictionaliy separate Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels, and had
acted improperly when he had dismissed two cabinet ministers who were
members of Walloon Rally.

Walloon Rally backed out of the coalition.

In the ensuing election, Walloon Rally was dealt a crushing defeat,
27

falling from 7% of the vote to 2 .$3%»

The Flemish Catholics, Tinde

mans * party, garnered an extra three percent of the vote, a strong vote
of confidence.
Tindemans formed a new coalition of his CVP, Walloon Socialists,
Volksunie (Flemish regionalists), and the Front Democratique des
Francophones (FDF), a Brussels-based Francophone party.

In October

1978, Volksunie began pressuring Tindemans to alter certain policies
regarding the implementation of the regional arrangement.

Volksunie
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TABLE H

26

;

BELGIAN COALITIONS, 1946-1978

Elections
1946-1949

Duration
Socialist
Socialist
Socialist
Socialist

(minority)
+ Liberal + Communist
+ Liberal + Communist
+ Catholic

i
4
7i
29

1949

Catholics + Liberal

10

1950-1954

Catholic
Catholic
Catholic

2
16
27

1954-1958

Socialist + Liberal

51

1958-1961

Catholic
Catholic + Liberal

4
30

1961-1965

Catholic + Socialist

51

1965-1968

Catholic + Socialist
Catholic + Liberal

8
23

1968-1971

Catholic + Socialist

41

1971-1974

Catholic + Socialist
Catholic + Socialist + Liberal

10
12

1974-1977

Flemish Catholic + Liberal (minority)
Flemish Catholic + Liberal + Walloon Rally

12
22

1977

Flemish Catholic + Walloon Socialists + Volksunie
+ F,D.F.

18

1978

Catholic + Walloon Socialists + F.D.F. (pro tern)
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finally pulled out of the coalition, forcing’ Tindemans to resign.

In

the election of December 1978, Volksunie suffered a similar fate to the
one that its Walloon counter-part had suffered in the previous election,
losing 6 of its 21 seats.

The CVP and its Walloon counter-part, the

Parti Social-Chr etien, had, in the meantime, climbed to over 38% of
the vote, its highest total in almost twenty years.

29

The efforts of the Belgian elites to end the language problem
has helped reinstate the older pattern of cleavages, at least in part.
The traditional powers in Flanders, the CVP and the Liberals are re
asserting themselves.

The parties in Brussels are entering a new order

with an emphasis on moderate secular liberalism.

The crisis seems to

have abated.
Luxembourg, as indicated in Table I, has been controlled by
Christian-Social-led coalitions for seme time.

These coalitions, how

ever, are not always the same two parties, and even when they are, re
shuffling of portfolios among ministers and numerical redistribution
of-appointments to ministerial positions is by no means uncommon.

The

only significant change that has taken place in Luxembourg's political
atmosphere in many years is the recent expansion of the Democrat party,
the secular middle class.

In one election, they have jumped from being

a perennial also-ran to the head of a coalition..
In Luxembourg, in Belgium, and in the Netherlands, one fact is
apparent:

no bloc can form a coalition with other blocs unless it is

willing to negotiate with those other blocs from the standpoint of
mutual legitimacy.

There is, in addition, a tendency for fragmentation

of the individual blocs to be limited.

Coalitions, even with the five

blocs of the Netherlands, tend to revolve around the parties which can
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TABLE

30

CABINET COALITIONS IN LUXEMBOURG, 1937-1974

Seats

1937

Catholic* & Liberal**

16/26

1946

P.S.C., Socialists, Democrats, Communists

SO/51

1948

P.S.C. & Socialists

37/51

1951

P.S.C. & Socialists

39/52

1954

P.S.C. & Socialists

1*3/52

1959

P.S.C. & Democrats

32/52

1964

P.S.C. & Socialists

1*3/56

1968

P.S.C. & Socialists

39/56

1971

P.S.C. & Socialists

33/56

1974

Democrats & Socialists

31/59

*P.S.C.
**Democrats
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most consistently maintain a strong following from their individual
bloc.
How do these coalitions function, or more precisely, what aspects
of political behavior permit the elites to behave in a moderate fashion?
The answer to this is different in each country, but, by and large,
moderate behavior arises from a system of informal or formal rules.
The Dutch use a system based on informal rules which Arend Lijphart has
termed "unwritten, informal and implicit."

31

There are seven of these

rules, several of which over-laps
(1) the business of government,
(2) agreement to disagree,
(3 ) summit diplomacy,
(4 ) proportionality,
(5) depoliticization,
(6 ) secrecy,
(7 ) the government’s right to govern.
Two rules which are especially closely related are (l) the business of politics, and (7 ) the government’s right to govern.

32

For the

Dutch, .political interaction is an activity which is geared toward
problem-solving rather than ideological victories.

This does not mean

that ideologies are abandoned but rather that the elites seek to fulfill
goals for their blocs through compromise with other groups rather than
holding their position to be an all-or-nothing demand.
The cabinets are expected to operate efficiently with little
interference from the opposition parties in the States-General in the
day-to-day functions of the national government.

Although individual

attitudes concerning desirable policies vary, ”. . .

doctrinal disputes
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should not be allowed to stand in the way of getting the work done.”
This approach to government is contrasted with French politics.
For the French, politics is not viewed in the same light as it is in
the Netherlands.

Questions of economic and social welfare are viewed

as political questions, that is, they are argued for their philosophi
cal or ideological, rather than purely functional, qualities.

If the

Gaullists were to suddenly abandon their functional programs and em
brace those of the Communists, the two would, in spite of their practi
cal agreement, probably continue opposing one another on most other
levels, e.g., international, because their ideological attitudes would
still be at variance.

In short, attitudes, not programs, govern France.

Two other rules mentioned by Lijphart are, in effect, trade-offs
which allow the blocs to feel confident that the Cabinet is not likely
to harm them, even though the party with the most votes speaks with
the biggest voice.
depoliticization.

3k

These rules are (2) agreement to disagree and (5)
In the former case, the Dutch recognize that indi

viduals have different beliefs and that these beliefs need not be
changed.

Toleration of the convictions of others is seen as mandatory.

"Disagreements must not be allowed to turn into either mutual contempt
36
or proselytizing zeal.”

The principle here is not that all legisla

tion must be absolutely acceptable to all parties, but that widely
divergent opinions on one subject should not be allowed to stand in the
way of possible cooperation on other, more immediate questions.

Politi

cal interaction is not, therefore, a matter simply of majority rule.
Recognizing that antagonism in the present only reinforces future con
flict, the elites approach legislation with a primary goal of reaching
a generally acceptable agreement.
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The idea of depoliticization arises from the same principle, hut
it works from different perspectives.

Agreement to disagree implies a

desire of individual leaders to limit their fervor in defending their
groupfs interests.

Depoliticization is the act of making programs

politically neutral so that the program is not especially offensive to
a particular group.
Lijphart cites two examples.

In the first case, opinions in a

four-party coalition on colonial policy were so divergent that the only
alternatives were to table the question, which would mean the policy
would continue, or to try to solve it, which would cause deadlock.
matter was tabled and business proceeded as usual.

37

The

In a second case,

a piece of legislation involving a lottery was opposed by the Antirevolutionary Party on religious grounds.

Although supporters had the

necessary majority, they continued debates until compromises could be
worked out which would be attractive to the AEP.
-t
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Lijphartfs third and sixth characteristics are summit diplomacy

and secrecy.

39

These two characteristics are closely allied.

When cir

cumstances demand, leaders of the various parties can meet in private
to work on problems which require inputs from more than just the ruling
coalition.

As moderation and compromise may sometimes give the appear

ance of selling-out one's constituents, the compromises are best made
in private.

The ability to deal in secret allows the elites to follow

rule (2), the agreement to disagree.^
Lijphart terms his final point 'proportionality1, that is, when
parliament passes legislation, the distribution of funds is, by custom,
already set according to the proportion of individuals who formed each
bloc.

Whether it be funds for schools, membership in the Civil Service,
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appointments for burgomeister, or whatever,'the funds of positions are
distributed according to the proportion demanded by the array of rele
vant social blocs.

Although this sounds arbitrary, it must be remem

bered that, while the legislation was being passed, it was already being
;
ip. ,
'
designed to suit the needs of the various social blocs
(see Rule 2),
This last point is perhaps the most significant as it includes
the concept of the mutual recognition of the discreteness of the indi
vidual blocs.

In France, the government is run to suit the will of the

majority, the parties that won the election.

In the Netherlands, on

-the .other hand, the government runs its programs in a fashion which will
fit the needs of as many of the various groups as possible, based upon
the size of the group and the problems that it faces.
What the Dutch do by informal traditions, the Belgians do by
statutes in the national constitution.

Proportionality and the govem-

ment*s right to govern are the primary goals of these statutes.

k2

While

many countries1 governments operate exclusively on a system of checks
and balances controlling the abuse of power by a particular branch,
Belgium, as was suggested in the previous chapter, relies on concrete
rules of order to permit closer coordination of the efforts of the
executive and the legislature.

1*3

Although a system of checks and

balances does exist, Belgian law evolves in the legislative hall rather
than appearing fully grown from a council chamber.^

Hence, an MP could

conceivably make -unnecessary demands concerning the functioning of the
bureaucracy in exchange for approval of some other measure.

The con

stitution, however, is worded so that parliament is obliged to allow
the government to attend to the business of running the country.

M P ’s

may ask questions concerning substance and procedure in new legislation,
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but existing programs cannot be modified, except by extreme measures
such as dissolution of parliament.
Recognizing the presence of diverse social groups, the Belgians
were obliged to make allowances for the needs of all groups; the legis
lation was amended so that similar benefits were extended to other
relevant groups, in proportion to the size of the groups.

In .summary,

then, Belgium operates from a system of legally-mandated proportional
ity and right of the government to govern.
In the case of Luxembourg, there is virtually no information on
how the elites approach policy-making.

All that there is to go on are

the results of political activity, such as the compromise on schools,
where all schools are run by the state, but are under clerical influ
ence with regard to such procedures as which texts are most suitable.
Law is made for the general welfare and yet it is shaped to fit the
desires of the individual groups.

bS

Functionally, then, Luxembourg

works in the same fashion as its Dutch and Belgian neighbors.
Symbols of National Unity
The third of Lijphart1s characteristics of consociational poli
tics is the presence of some common symbol of national unity.

Each of

the three countries contain social blocs which have evolved into a
single -unit in terms of national identity.

One aid in this evolution

has been the monarch, who represents the state as a whole.

Cabinets

rise and fall, social blocs wax and wane, but the regime itself sym
bolized by the monarch is sacrosanct.

All tradition is embodied in

the monarch, and, indeed, the monarchs provide all three countries with
a sense of continuity in the face of a changing world.

Although all

three countries display these influences, we need only examine one—

Bh
1

Belgium— to see how the influences work in practice.

Focusing on the

Belgian kings alone may seem peculiar, hut as we remember from the
discussions in Chapter Two, all three monarchs have surrendered most
of their power to the legislatures and, of the three, only the Belgian
kings are constitutionally obliged to remain involved in more than
ceremonial activity.

This means that the Belgian kings display the

greatest scope of involvement and, hence, have the highest profiles.
In the Belgian kings, we are seeing the most active monarchs possible.
The Belgian royal house, Saxe-Coburg, is neither Flemish nor
Walloon, but German.

As such, the monarchy is unaligned on questions

of social justice, representing all the Belgian people.
Belgium have always had an active role in politics.

The kings of

Wielding more

authority than their Butch counterparts, they have often promoted
legislation or have intervened to resolve a deteriorating situation.
In 181*6, for example, Leopold I was informed of the concern held by
some for the safety of Flemish culture which was being buried by French
influences and by a "French in the parlor, Flemish in the kitchen"
attitude.^

He began a series of annual festivals and competitions
I rj

devoted to the advancement of Flemish culture.

Likewise, it was a

royal initiative to propose Edmond Leburton for Prime Minister in 1971
even though Leburton did not lead the majority party.

Finally, it was

also a royal initiative to call for elections in 197lj-> when Leburton
could not resolve a crisis.

1*8

As the monarchs are symbols of nationhood, it is mandatory that
they avoid becoming tarnished.

In 195bi as was previously mentioned,

questions were raised regarding the conduct of Leopold III during World
War I.

A referendum showed that Sk% of the people supported the King.

A breakdown of the vote showed that while the King was well supported
in Flanders, only 2*8^ of the Francophones supported him.

Rather than

risk becoming a 'Flemish* king to his Francophone subjects, Leopold
abdicated.

1+9

The Benelux countries represent a variety of backgrounds:
vincial, monarchical, religious and linguistic.

pro

The cleavages of Luxem

bourg seem minor compared to those of its Benelux partners, but it
should be remembered that without the benefit of the works of such
writers as Lijphart and Daalder, few people who had not made a study
of the Netherlands would be aware of the sharpness of the cleavages in
the Netherlands.

The important quality that is shared by the three

countries is that each country's social blocs have been politicized
in such a way that political parties tend to correspond to social or
ideological blocs, i.e., there is a close correlation between the
characteristics of an individual and the party for which he votes.
The blocs, to be sure, do not chase away potential converts, but they
do present distinct qualities and work to maintain that distinctive
ness.
The other important quality of consociational countries is their
approach to political activity.

Perhaps the most obvious characteris

tics are (l) that the elites tend to approach programs in terms of
trade-offs and compromises, gearing their individual goals to the
desires and needs of the whole, and (2) that the elites pursue their
task in a business-like fashion, seeking to resolve problems when pos
sible and to by-pass problems when a ready solution is not available.
In contrast to this, we have the example of the French and Italians,
who approach politics from the stand-point of ideological purity.

For

them, the sacrifice of an ideological position is far worse than the
seeming chaos of the political system.

Operating from the position

that their individual group has the best conceivable program, to create
flaws in it in the name of "accommodation” is little more than a betra
yal of one's party and one's constituency.
The consociational elites do not seek compromise for its own
sake, but rather seek to gain part of their goals, which is to say
benefits for their group* by a process of bargaining with trade-offs.
Hence, political competition is just as intense in consociational coun
tries, and negotiation just as difficult, but competition is more in
formal and tends to be obscured by the accommodative practices which
are seen on the surface.
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CONCLUSION
CHARACTERISTICS

OP

CONSOCIATIONAL

DEMOCRACY

In the preceding chapters, we examined the major theories of
consociational democracy and then analyzed them in the light of the
experience of the Benelux countries.

"When we "began the study, we

wanted to know how consociational countries developed, and if these
countries had particular qualities which could he identified and dif
ferentiated from those in non-consociational countries.

Chapter Two

examined the countries in terms of their socio-cultural development,
allowing us to discover the source of consociational democracy; Chap
ter Three, in turn, provided information on the specific consociational
qualities.
In Chapter Two, two points seemed especially significant:
Daalderfs theory of consociational development, and the concept of
mutual recognition of legitimacy.

Daalder proposed that consociational

political activity, moderate interaction among elites of distinct groups,
pre-dated the development of tension between the groups.

As larger

units of society were enfranchised, the elites provided, in the words
of Rose and Urwin, a framework for the political mobilization of these
people.

The social groups made this arrangement as a channel for

grievances, allowing their elite to handle interaction with other elites
in a manner to which the elite had grown accustomed.

As a result, the

mutual accommodation practiced by the early elites became the modus
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operandi of the elites of the new social blocs.

A good way to describe this process is through the concept of
legitimacy.

As the patterns of elite interaction evolved, and. as the

masses entered the political framework provided by the elites, in short,
as the whole system developed, political development was based on the
recognition of a right or propriety of each group to exist as legiti
mate units.

This mutual recognition of legitimacy occurs on three

levels:
(1) There is, on the part of all social groups, recognition of
the right of the other groups of society to exist as* dis
crete parts of the system;
(2) The elites of the social groups are recognized by their group,
by other groups, and, especially, by the elites of those other
groups as legitimate representatives of their group;
(3) There is a common recognition by both elites and masses of the
legitimacy of the regime, that is, all parties recognize that
they are part of a single political unit, and that their for
tunes are bound to the fortunes of all groups that recognize
the common allegiance.
In short, legitimacy occurs on three levels:
and the whole regime.

social groups, elites,

The good of the individual unit is bound to the

good of the whole.
These three facets of a political system, social groups, the
elites, and the State, were examined in terms of the specific qualities
of political interaction in Chapter Three.

This examination allows us

to describe each of the facets, and the type of interaction and inter
relationships which occur in a consociational democracy.

A consociational democracy is generated by political interaction
between discrete social blocs.

Although other countries have reinforc

ing cleavages in society, the cleavages in a consociational country are
institutionalized.

Each group provides its own means of dissemination

of information throughout the group, that is, each group has its own
leaders, media, social and professional organizations, and at times,
its own educational system.

The most important quality of social blocs

in a consociational country, however, is that each bloc generates its
own political party, the political party representing the political
elite of the social group.

To determine if a country has its social

cleavages arranged in a consociational pattern then, we must examine
the relationship between the major social groups and the relevant poli
tical parties.
In Chapter Three, we discovered three methods for discerning this
relationship.

The first method is to determine the relationship between

party preference and social group.

In a consociational country, identi

fication by members of a particular group with one of the parties will
be extremely strong.

We find that knowledge of the social group to

which an individual belongs allows us to determine his political affilia
tion and vice versa.
A second possible method is to compare the voting patterns in the
various regions to the array of social groups.

We can expect in most

cases that, as each group has its own socio-political attitudes, those
attitudes will be reflected in the voting pattern of the regions where
a specific group predominates.

This method is not as precise as the

actual comparison of party preference to social group because the data
can be obscured by the presence of enclaves from other groups.

As a

result, it is best that this method be used in tandem with the third
method, the comparison of changes in the strength of the political
parties to changes in society.
In a consociational system, the political parties are reflections
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of the social groups.

If charges in the parties are congruent with

the social change, then we can expect that a consociational system is
present.

Certain specific qualities of consociational political parties

were noted from examinations which used this method.

By and large,

changes in party strengths will "be slow, "because changes in attitudes
or in social groups generally occur only over the passage of a long
period of time.

2Tew parties will be generated by two influences:

either by the expansion and defection of a particular sub-group, or by
an extremist wing breaking free in a time of crisis.

In the former

case, the new party will continue to exist as long as the sub-group
recognizes a need for independence from the groups to which it had adheredi

In the case of extremist parties, these parties exist as long

as -a perceived threat or need exists, then go into a rapid decline.

In

both cases, new parties will be obvious off-shoots of the older parties.
- These three methods allow us to determine if politicized social
cleavages exist in a given country because they show the close relation
ship between the social blocs and their elites.

The second facet of

political activity, elite interaction, is equally important in the dis
cussion of consociational democracy because it is the ability of the
elites to work together in a system of compromise and mutual accommoda
tion which gives consociational democracy its moderate political
atmosphere.
Prom our earlier discussion, we know that consociational elites
recognize the legitimacy of other elites to act as representatives of
other groups.

They also recognize the right of other elites to assume

a leadership role in determining common policy.

These elite character

istics are shown by the way in which parties associate and by the formal

9h
or tacit rules which govern elite interaction.
The most convenient measure of the willingness of consociational
elites to work together is shown by Cabinet coalitions.

In consocia

tional systems, the parties associate without regard for ideological
or religious background, but rather with a desire to establish a work
able coalition.

Eence, coalitions can be formed freely among the vari

ous political parties.
Elite interaction is governed by rules of the game which have been
established by traditional custom and usage.

These rules may vary in

exact form from country to country, but the political foundation for the
rule will be the same.
(k) A Cabinet has a right to govern in a business-like fashion.
(b ) The benefits of legislation will be distributed according to
proportionality, that is, each group receives its fair share.
(C) Political negotiations between elites can be carried out by
means of ftsummit diplomacy" and in secrecy.
The first of these rules reflects the recognition of elites that
certain members of their body, although from a different group, can
assume a leadership role in the policy-making process.

Although these

elites who are not in the Cabinet can oppose policy, it is opposed be
cause it is not the best policy, not because it is someone else’s policy.
The second rule is a reciprocal arrangement between elites with regard
to the first rule.

While the Opposition leaders are.expected to act in

a judicious fashion, the Cabinet is expected, in turn, to recognize the
rights of the other blocs.

An electoral majority does not give license

to the Cabinet to ignore the other blocs, but rather gives the respon
sibility of taking basic policy and amending it so that no group suffers
from that policy.
The third rule, summit diplomacy and secrecy, arises from the
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recognition by the blocs of the elites1right to govern.

Acting as

representatives of the individual blocs, the elites must approach
policy flexibly so that the needs of individual blocs can be fulfilled
by mutual accommodation.

The ability of elites to interact in what

Lehmbruch termed intense, informal discussion points to a high level
of trust placed in the elites by the blocs as a whole.
The three rules then could also be described as the mutual
recognition of legitimacy between elites, the recognition of the rights
of the individual blocs, and the recognition by the blocs of the elites’
ability to act as legitimate representatives.

These perceptions in

clude all of the facets of a political system except one, the State it
self.
The State represents the common interests shared by all of the
members of society, the sense of community.

It transcends all cleav

ages and provides a point of reference to which all groups can look to
for .protection.

Even though individuals may not like members of a cer

tain other group, all parties can look to the same ultimate source of
sovereign authority, whether it be symbolized by a monarch or by a set
of common traditions.

At the same time, we found in our discussion

that this symbol of national unity should remain sacrosanct, free from
tarnish in the eyes of the majorities in all relevant groups.

If it

seems to one group that the symbol is associated with an opposing group,
then the situation must be repaired.

A symbol is a legitimate point of

reference only if it has the same attraction to all groups.
The symbol of national unity’s most important quality, beyond
providing a point of commonality, is that it gives the system a sense
of continuity in the face of change.

Even though cabinets and leaders

may rise and fall, and social groups wax and wane, the symbol remains
as an umbrella over all political interaction.

AFTERWORD
CONSOCIATIONAL

DEMOCRACY

AND

THE

INTERNATIONAL

SYSTEM

The Benelux countries, as moderate polities, represent one of
two types of political activity which can exist in a country with
politicized social cleavages.

The other type is the competitive sys

tem of Prance, where groups seek to achieve goals which reflect the
ideals of their group alone.

This situation is the same as the inter

national system, where there are countries which favor cooperation for
mutual "benefit and those which seek to gain regardless of the cost to
others.

These attitudes are not discrete, "but in fact represent a con

tinuum of ideas ranging from strong competition to limited cooperation
to strong cooperation.

How could this understanding of socio-political

activity affect the internal or external politics of countries?
With regard to internal politics, Hans Daalder has suggested that
it is not only possible, but perhaps necessary for developing countries
to employ a consociational approach to the maintenance and expansion of
their regime.^- Many new countries have boundaries which have little
regard for social identification, but rather were laid down by Europeans
to divide spheres of influence.

Countries like Zaire have upwards of

two hundred and fifty separate tribes which must be psychologically
inculcated with the concept of belonging to a single nation.

Daalder

suggests that the most convenient means would be to build on old founda
tion such as tribal councils or similar bodies so that individuals come
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to attach the development of their tribe or religious group to the
growing well-being of the whole state.

2

In countries with on-going

crises, like Bolivia, Northern Ireland, or Spain, the implementations
of a consociational system would assuredly be more difficult, but as
the system is a product of attitudes, and attitudes can change over
time, the construction of such a system is not utterly impossible.
In the broader context of the international system, the same
rules apply.

If the general public can be influenced to believe a

particular goal is best, then the system can be altered so that that
goal is pursued.

We can examine this approach on three levels, coop

eration between countries which are forced to cooperate, those which
only wish limited cooperation, and thos9 which feel cooperation is the
best possible course of action.
Cooperation is often forced upon competitive groups when a com
mon threat presents itself.

Usually cooperation will take the form

of a loose association such as an alliance.

By its very nature, an

alliance tends to fade in importance over time.

In the first place,

an alliance is formed to guarantee peace, either by presenting a united
front to an external threat or by unity under some dominant alliancemember to insure peace among the alliance members (collective security).
When the threat— either internal or external— is no longer a threat,
then the necessity of maintaining tight coordination also fades.

A

good example of this is the alliance that developed during the 19^0 fs
between Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, et al.,
which lasted only as long as Germany was fighting.

When Germany fell,

the alliance, being purely a military convenience, collapsed.
alliance achieved its purpose, but could do no more.

The

If Hitler's
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Germany had lasted longer, so too would the alliance.
The collapse of an alliance is not bad in and of itself as long
as it was able to achieve its hoped-for result.

It is quite often im

possible for more to be accomplished because alliances are intended to
i

freeze the international status quo.

■

No country gives special privi

leges to other countries beyond what is necessary for joint action,
and no country gives up any of its sovereign right to independent ac
tion.

In a purely competitive system, then, each country is respon

sible only to itself.

The good of the country is defined in terms

which emphasise the independence of action rather than interdependence.
>A system of limited cooperation is based upon the recognition
that the events in different countries are interdependent, that the
internal policies of one country, e.g., economic policy, can influence
international situations.

If conquest is impossible, then countries

must resort to cooperation to influence these otherwise discrete events.
It is in this type of forum that consociational countries begin to make
their presence known.
Consociational elites are professional bargainers, dealing daily
with situations demanding complex negotiations.

Their goal is to reach

a mutually acceptable compromise which will yield the greatest benefit
possible for their individual group.

The transfer to an international

gathering seeking the common good is not, therefore, substantially dif
ferent from activity at home.
In this regard, Robert S. Wood and J. L. Heldring have produced
works which describe the Dutch approach to politics within the confines
of the European Community as communitarian, that is, the Dutch are
actively promoting policies which will bind the countries of the E. C.
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into a strong unit both economically and politically.

3 Their efforts

have not stopped there, but rather have been geaxed toward the expan
sion of the Community to include important actors which were not at
first part of the Community, such as Great Britain.

Eeldring and Wood,

in their articles, both agreed that the Butch were trying to promote a
system which had united several provinces into a single unit as a means
of gradually integrating several States on the international level.
Within the European Community, the common political attitudes of
the six original countries were much the same as the Butch position.
In 1958> when France came under the control of Charles de Gaulle, the
situation changed.

While the Butch remained ostentatiously pro

integration, the French sought instead to use the framework of the E. C.
to establish economic hegemony for themselves over Europe.

The struggle

became one of ’greater Holland’, the gradual unification of separate
provinces, against ’greater France*, the retention of older national
isms.
Today the position has altered slightly with the primary obstacles
to integration arising from economic difficulties and from recalcitrance
on the part of the British.

The economic difficulties arise from unem

ployment, the energy crisis, and the deteriorating position of the Uni
ted States in the international economic system.

As for the British,

they are simply not convinced of the advisability of strong integra
tion.

In spite of all of these problems, the Butch efforts, now joined

by most other E. C. members, are continuing.
Strong cooperation exists when all of the actors agree, tacitly
at least, that cooperation is the best approach to generating benefits
and minimizing losses.

A system of limited cooperation can drift to
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this level from time to time, but the ideal results occur when coopera
tion is the policy, no matter who is running the Cabinet,

Strong

cooperation exists among the Benelux countries, stronger than in any
other international economic organization.

In spite of the difficul

ties involved, such as the massive exchange rate adjustments necessary
to prevent wage and price imbalances,^ problems have been viewed as
obstacles to be overcome rather than reasons for abandoning the program
entirely.

The Benelux countries, which have resisted unification in

the past, are now building a union based on the same principles used
to govern the individual countries:

the good of the part is bound to

the good of the whole, and every group gets its fair share.

It may

well be, therefore, that the consociationalism practiced in each Bene
lux state has enabled them to engender successful policies of modera
tion and accommodation in their relations with each other.
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